



Düsseldorfer Institut für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik
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Why German - US Relations Matter to the Alliance

Germany's theoretically evolving role
as center power in Europe

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Why German-US relations matter to the transatlantic Alliance

A declaration on NATO transformation of October 6, 2002 stated, NATO needed to be “capable of taking action whenever the security of its members was threatened, upon the basis of the United Nations Charter. By making it clear that there is no safe haven for those who would threaten our societies or for those who would harbor such people”,¹ the deterrent element of Alliance strategy was strengthened.

The North Atlantic Council should decide actions on a case-by-case basis. Where NATO as a whole was not engaged, allies willing to take action should be able to make use of NATO assets, procedures and practices. The declaration stressed high priority goals essential to the full range of Alliance missions including the defense against terrorism.

This new initiative was to be based on firm national commitments with specific target dates. National commitments should be made transparent for parliamentary monitoring and oversight. Priority should be given to projects maximizing multi-nationality, and which had the potential to become common NATO assets. NATO and EU capabilities initiatives needed to be mutually reinforced and thoroughly harmonized through permanent co-ordination mechanisms and procedures in a spirit of openness.

NATO should redouble its efforts to reduce the fragmentation of defense procurement efforts through the pooling of military capabilities, co-operative acquisition of equipment and common funding. It should reduce to a minimum the obstacles for the sharing of technology. The alliance had to be able to act wherever NATO's interests were threatened, creating coalitions under NATO's own mandate, as well as contributing to mission-based coalitions, concerning both, old and new threats.²

NATO General Secretary, Lord Robertson referred to the experience NATO had with post-conflict stabilization, as in Kosovo and Macedonia.³ On October 8, 2002 Robertson declared, an enormous number of security issues on the Euro-Atlantic agenda required the greatest possible communication and coordination among Europeans and North Americans. The November 2002 Prague Summit would be a transforming event for the Alliance.

It covered a wide range from terrorism, NATO's military command arrangements and headquarters structure, to a further development of Partnership. The most visible issues referred to enlargement and improvements to NATO's military capabilities.⁴ The question of capabilities concerned the member countries of NATO and of the EU. Because each nation had only one set of forces, it was necessary to make the best use possible of the scarce resources, avoiding duplication and overlaps.

The message was very clear: the European Capabilities Action Plan and NATO's Prague Capabilities Commitment needed to be coherent. Work in full transparency on capabilities issues was imperative, if EU-NATO impasse was to be avoided or ended.⁵

What do these challenges mean for reunified Germany, given recent tensions with the United States?

This paper discusses the particular challenges for Germany as an evolving center power in Europe. Will Germany be willing and able to play a constructive role to help streamlining EU-NATO co-operation? On the other side, will she continue to use her influence on EU to counter-balance the US – together with France?⁶

In the analysis of the author of this paper, worsened US-German relations, particularly – though not exclusively – on the issue of Iraq,⁷ have had their problematic impact in two main areas: *first*, they added to divisions within the so-called intra-European and intra-EU theatre; *second*, they kept hampering the so-called NATO transformation.

Germany as a key regional player needs to assist transforming NATO, instead of encouraging division within the Atlantic community and its international or regional organizations. This means, Germany actively should promote the streamlining of capabilities and the closest as possible cooperation between EU and NATO in peacemaking and (post-conflict) peacekeeping.

Further NATO and EU enlargement makes the challenges ahead the more obvious and crucial as enlargement will enhance the number of US friendly member countries. A European Union that aims – whether indirectly or not - at duplicating or decoupling from NATO, will find itself quasi-automatically on a collision course with the US.⁸

Such policy will not only harm the capability of the Alliance to meet the soft and hard power-related security challenges of the 21st century, but also diminish the prospect of a functioning and well integrated common European foreign and security policy.⁹ To contribute accordingly to NATO *or* to strengthen the common European foreign and security policy cannot be a question of either – or, as contributions by European/EU countries (be they NATO members or not) will matter in how the Alliance adapts to a new security environment, and whether NATO stays relevant.

Any German foreign policy that is both constructive and responsible needs to consider these inter-dependent challenges. By contrast, the diplomatic stunts¹⁰ of the last months arguably reinvented Germany as problematic partner in the Alliance and handicapped its role as second important partner to the US – next to the UK. It is clear, that this cannot be in Germany's own national interest.

The current German government within a few months gave up on fundamental principles, which characterized German foreign policy ever since the end of the 2nd World War and throughout most of the 1990s.

Such principles were: Never to go it alone; never to make the ultimate decision between Paris or Washington; never to get into a geo-political 'two frontier situation' between Paris and Moscow – without other strong diplomatic ties with London and Washington. By buying into French plans how to reform the institutions of EU, Germany furthermore gave up its role to protect the interests of smaller EU countries within the Commission.

Holding on to such principles ever since the 1950s, allowed Germany to continuously mature into its growing role as partner in EU and NATO, under US leadership and under US protection throughout and in the aftermath of the Cold War. French-German partnership was initiated by the United States. German Reunification was possible only with the strong support of the

US. If calls of German Chancellor, Gerhard Schröder for Germany to become a ‘normal’ country mean all but the discontinuity of a functioning foreign policy ever since the end of the 2nd World War, such ‘normalcy’ misses what is truly at stake for democratic Germany as the largest country in EU.

On the problematic impact on NATO transformation

September 11, 2001 arguably changed the parameters defining transatlantic relations. Germany irrevocably declared its post World War II era over, and NATO faced a new collective threat. Lord Robertson on May 7, 2002 argued, NATO at 20 would go global, where the threat was. Important consequences of 9/11 were both, a speeded-up of NATO enlargement and the established of the NATO-Russia Council. NATO as a diplomatic platform was transforming to new challenges.¹¹

The National Security Strategy cites “*strengthening alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against us and our friends*”, as one important part of its international strategy “to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against us and our friends”.¹² While the United States would constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community, they would not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise its right of self-defense by acting preemptively against such terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm against its people and its country. In leading the campaign against terrorism, the United States would forge new, productive international relationships and redefine existing ones in ways that meet the challenges of the 21st century.

The US proposition to create a NATO reaction force was accepted at NATO’s November Summit in Prague 2002.¹³ Throughout the Prague Summit, German media focused on the question whether US President George Bush and Schröder would shake hands:

“Mr. Bush assailed nations that are ‘inward-looking or isolated by indifference’, clearly a reference to Chancellor Schröder’s use of his opposition to the American campaign against Saddam Hussein, as a centerpiece of his recent re-election campaign (...) From John F. Kennedy’s ‘Ich bin ein Berliner’ speech, to Ronald Reagan’s controversial visit to the Bitburg cemetery, postwar American presidents have emphasized reconciliation and unity when speaking of Germany, not memories of war. This time, however, Mr. Bush seemed to be reminding Germans that Europe today stood shoulder to shoulder with America despite them, not because of them”.¹⁴

Particularly troubling was the blockage of NATO to provide Turkey with defensive weapons, shortly before intervention in Iraq in spring 2003. While NATO managed to overcome this deadlock, current tensions between the US administration and some NATO members on the post-conflict transformation in Iraq, seems to point at more trouble on the Atlantic horizon.¹⁵ A NATO Review in the wake of Iraq in that sense reads:¹⁶

“Yet it is also true that, for the United Kingdom and others, especially the recently oppressed peoples of ‘new Europe’, the United States’ new mission is an Atlantic mission. They wish to keep the United States fully engaged in Europe. They are wary of a European Union dominated by France and Germany. And they are increasingly willing to be engaged elsewhere in the world together with the United States. Now enjoying their first taste of the US-led liberal international order, the Pax Americana, they have not interest in creating a European ‘counterweight’”.

On the problematic impact on the intra-European/intra-EU theatre

Another unfortunate impact of troubled German-US relations – after Schröder's irresponsible election rhetoric and in the aftermath of Iraq - seems to have concerned the European theatre itself.

Strong German-US relations contribute to intra-European stability. Without them, France may have begun to complain about a possibly too strong British influence in the transatlantic theatre. This may have reinforced French policy throughout early spring 2003, to get EU to formulate its own common policy on Iraq, which would then isolate Great Britain. On the other side, after Schröder did not succeed in London by the end of September 2002, to get British Prime Minister Tony Blair to help him restore US-German relations, Schröder's focus shifted across the Rhine, as to get France to join ranks to counter US-UK policy on Iraq.¹⁷

When France¹⁸ and Germany came out against “any military action on the basis of UN resolution 1441”, one week before UN inspectors reported to the Security Council, this did not represent a common European policy on Iraq.

By contrast, it made the split within the EU, Europe as such, NATO and the UN Security Council obvious.¹⁹ During an emergency EU Summit on February 17, 2003, Jacques Chirac threatened Central and Eastern European countries they would risk their EU membership if they supported the US on Iraq. Such experience might induce ‘smaller’ Western and Eastern European countries to wonder, whether France and Germany should be allowed to impose their concepts of further European integration on the EU as a whole. A previous letter by eight European countries – partly in EU, partly not – had obviously infuriated Paris, because it precisely highlighted intra-European and intra-EU splits on Iraq, but also on other transatlantic issues.

Such divide was further illustrated, when a Summit of four NATO members decided on a purely EU based defense.²⁰

More on Germany's role and challenges in EU and NATO

So, has the German government in fact pursued a policy prone to divide the transatlantic community?

Does Germany hide behind Europe, while keeping Europeanizing its foreign policy?²¹ Does it promote its concept of further European integration - in the form of a federate super-state – to use EU for its own national purpose, sometimes together with France, sometimes alone? In contrast to a more nationalistic France pursuing its foreign policy openly: Is the soft-power oriented German coalition government trying to avoid more hard power responsibility and burden-sharing foremost in NATO? Why should such policy be able to empower EU after all?²²

The answer is, it cannot and it will not: If Germany as largest EU member is at risk not to meet the security challenges²³ as a sovereign member of the Atlantic community in the 21st century, this concerns EU (and NATO) as a whole.

The Atlantic alliance with EU and NATO at its core would not but be weakened by Berlin's unwillingness to (further) modernize its Army, to contribute more peacemaking and robust

peacekeeping to the Alliance's most trusted security organization, which is NATO, and to actively support the closest possible cooperation of EU and NATO.

An interview at *American Enterprise Institute* on June 3, 2003 points at the core problem with the help of a metaphor:

"A French driver is driving a German vehicle. On the backseat are covering smaller Western and Eastern European countries, while the French driver heads the German car full speed towards an American tank".²⁴

Given Germany's obvious contributions to special-forces operations, to ISAF in Afghanistan, as well as to other crisis regions in recent months and years, such perceptions by Allies become the more tragic and unnecessary.²⁵

They raise strong questions and point at the challenges the current German leadership faces – in two regards: *first*, reassuring Germany's Allies of its foreign policy still being based on both, a strong transatlantic link and European integration; *second*, encouraging a public debate within Germany about its national interests and its role in the world.²⁶

Summarizing conclusions for a responsible German foreign and security policy

The fact that France and Germany could be perceived as unreliable allies in EU and NATO, had an impact on NATO's transformation and the challenges outlined in its October 6, 2002 declaration, concerning softer and harder security policy, to deal with both, internal conflicts and global terrorism.

Furthermore, it had an impact on EU enlargement, the constitutional challenges EU currently faces, and how the EU (both the Commission and the Office of the High Representative of the Council of Ministers) deals with crisis and conflict prevention and other security threats of the 21st century.²⁷ Particularly the success of NATO (and EU) enlargement, the streamlining of capabilities and the creation of a NATO reaction force – to intervene in or out of area – will also depend on Germany, positioned at the heart of Europe, between East and West.

Zbigniew Brzezinski identified Germany and the US as the main proponents of NATO enlargement and raised the question, what an ever closer relationship between reunified Germany and the US would probably mean to a France, which would be geo-strategically weakened by an eastward shift of Europe's center!²⁸

Germans today are faced with the question, how seriously its current government will be prepared to change its underlying foreign policy of contrasting EU integration with a strong transatlantic link?²⁹ In addition, which role will the current coalition partners play in the future, when it comes to sending German troops out of area, participating as NATO member in a coalition of the willing?³⁰

While Germany may continue not to live up to its theoretical and potential role in the Alliance, as well as to keep its public misinformed, new and future members of NATO in Eastern and Central Europe, like Poland, Rumania and Bulgaria, already have stepped up to the plate, as to help streamlining NATO capabilities. On the US side, the decision seems to have already been

taken: The re-structuring of NATO's command and headquarters, as well as NATO enlargement, might best be matched by NATO structures physically moving eastwards, too. US troops in Germany will (partly) be re-deployed from the Rhine to the Lakes of Masuria and the Danube.³¹

When Donald Rumsfeld invited France and Germany in June 2003 to contribute peacekeepers to a post-conflict Iraq, this clearly signaled a still open window of opportunity for Germany to be or become part (again) of the new Atlantic agenda.

Final Conclusions for German Foreign and Security Policy

The following part lists main challenges for a responsible German foreign and security policy.

- Germany needs to work hard to ensure the US stays committed to European safety. US leadership can be regarded as prerequisite to enable particularly reunified Germany to continuously mature into its growing role, without the so-called Croatia effect of the early 90s, and without Germany's Allies feeling nervous about its economic and political might;³²
- Germany needs to become fully aware of its potential, given its geo-strategic position: Germany can do a lot to strengthen - instead of weakening - constructive US-Russian, constructive US-French and constructive US-Turkish relations.
- Germany needs to become aware of the troubling effect recent developments had: currently, the most important bi-lateral partners to the US in EU (and NATO) are: Spain to the West of Germany; Poland to the East of Germany; Great Britain to the North of Germany; Italy to the South of Germany. This scenario seems to confirm: Germany is clearly not fulfilling its potential as integrating center power.
- Germany needs to formulate its own national interests in a transparent way, instead of binding its foreign policy to French national interests. German national interests should consider global threats, in addition to policy concerning further European Union integration.
- Germany deals with the following two long-term challenges with regard to the war against global terrorism post-9/11: *First*, to convince the German public that there is a threat; *second*, to seriously analyze what Germany in EU and NATO can contribute.³³
- Germany needs to contribute its share to keep NATO relevant, given the new threats of the 21st century. While the US described its policy in the *National Security Strategy*, and NATO highlighted *NATO transformation*, Germany has to make up its mind, how to *contribute* to necessary alliance adaptation. Rhetoric games regarding EU capabilities or the establishment of yet another under-financed EU army – will not help enhancing NATO-EU cooperation, which is *essential* in the new security environment. Germany has to play an important role in this regard, also facilitating between NATO countries that are not in EU, like Turkey, and the other way around.
- German foreign policy needs to become more pro-active to major global developments, instead of reactive. This concerns both peacemaking and (robust) peacekeeping. It is precisely the experience the young Federal Republic made as liberated country, under

the Marshall Plan, which should enable Germany today to contribute considerably to complex emergency and reconstruction processes, like in Afghanistan and Iraq. Germany needs to get serious with regard to bolstering up its defense budget. The challenges for NATO and its individual member states, like Germany, have been pointed out in the US National Security Strategy. They highlight the challenges the German government faces. Given current tensions and existing realities within the German coalition government in question, these challenges seem to be difficult to be met.

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- ¹ Declaration on NATO transformation, Standing Committee, Brussels, October 6, 2002.
- ² To achieve this, the following steps were necessary: first, expansion of NATO's membership to those democratic nations willing and able to share the burden of defending and advancing NATO's common interests; second, ensuring that the military forces of NATO member states had appropriate combat contributions to make in coalition warfare; third, development of planning processes to enable those contributions to become effective multinational fighting forces.
- ³ Interview with General Secretary, Lord Robertson, *Fox News*, August 1, 2003: From on August 11th, NATO would take over the command of ISAF in Afghanistan. With regard to Iraq, 11 NATO members had already pledged troops for the post-conflict stabilization and transition process. From on August 2003, NATO nations, like Poland and Spain, with the logistical support of NATO, would be on the ground in Iraq to share the burden. What Allies in EU and NATO needed to do in general, was to learn more about how to deal with conflict in pre- and post-settlement situations. NATO was used to deal with the sharp edges of the killing fields of the Balkans. The Alliance faced the challenge how to address post-conflict situations.
- ⁴ Speech by NATO Secretary General, EU Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Defence Policy and Common Security, Lord Robertson, NATO on-line library, October 8, 2002.
- ⁵ 'Transforming the Alliance', NATO Review, Summer 2002.
- ⁶ In a personal interview with Karsten Voigt at the Auswärtige Amt in Berlin in January 2001, he argued, NATO always had been about collective defense. ESDP would enable the Europeans to build capacities 'next to the Americans.' He stressed the Petersberg tasks. Most crises within European interest, as the Balkans needed 'exactly that.' He could not necessarily imagine a potential conflict in Europe, where more so-called hard power security was necessary, where peacekeeping developed into peacemaking or full war.
- ⁷ Conflicts between the US and Germany manifested themselves on a variety of alternating issues, from the Kyoto Protocol and missile defense to the ICC; Michaela Hertkorn, 'The Impact of September 11th on ESDP and Coercive Prevention: The German Perspective', *Seton Hall Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations*, winter/spring 2003;
- ⁸ What concerns US leadership, four scenarios can be envisioned: First, the US does not lead, and EU is unwilling or incapable to act. This was the case in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the early 90s. Second, the US leads, and EU is not capable of doing it alone or to contribute a major share. This arguably was given during the Kosovo intervention. Third, The US assumes and claims its leadership role, and EU develops own security and defense capabilities. This may be the intention of ESDP, as promoted by the British, who have stressed the need for ESDP not decoupling from NATO. Such arrangement would likely strengthen NATO and see the transatlantic relationship inter-related with further European integration. Fourth, The US does not lead, and EU continues to develop its own security and defense policy. This carries the risk of ESDP being perceived, at least by some European countries, as independent from NATO. This may lead to a sustainable division of labor between NATO and EU. France has aimed at developing European hard power capabilities, separately from NATO. Germany – with its strong pacifist tradition as a domestic constraint – may have been tempted, to regard ESDP and its Petersberg tasks providing the ultimate soft power alternative to NATO hard power collective defense. How would these scenarios play out in the aftermath of 9/11 and throughout the Iraq crisis? See Michaela Hertkorn, 'The Relevance of Perceptions in Foreign Policy: A German – US Perspective', *World Affairs*, fall 2001;
- ⁹ 'Frage unter Freunden – Wohin geht Amerika?', Sabine Christiansen (Sendung vom 06.07.2003), <http://www.sabine-christiansen.de/2003/07/06/c_archiv.html> (accessed 11 November 2003). Angela Merkel stressed, a Europe or European Union set in confrontation with the US would never be united.
- ¹⁰ By the French, Germany and Russian trio upon intervention in Iraq in spring 2003.
- ¹¹ Presentation by NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson, the 20th Manfred-Wörner-Seminar for German-American-Understanding, Brussels, May 7, 2002;
- ¹² The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002.
- ¹³ Secretary Rumsfeld en route to a meeting of NATO Ambassadors in Poland on September 22, 2002 outlined several initiatives for NATO: First, improving capabilities, NATO countries had already agreed on; second a NATO response force. NATO's mixed capabilities needed to get together so that in the event of a problem in or out of NATO area, NATO would have a responsive capability that was real and functioned together. This was a good way to assure NATO relevance. The third issue involved NATO command structure and headquarters. While the US proposition for a NATO response force was initially welcome by Spain and Italy, German Defense Minister Struck announced to examine the initiative carefully, with France highlighting the need for corresponding UN resolutions. See Michaela Hertkorn, 'On German-US Relations from Pre-Bush to Post-9/11-Bush: Why Do German Relations Matter to the Transatlantic Relationship', Conference Paper (presented at BAAS/TSA Conference, Aberystwyth, April 12, 2003).
- ¹⁴ Serge Schmemmann, 'A speech recalls Europe's ghosts', *New York Times*, November 23, 2002.

- ¹⁵ 'Kein Irak-Einsatz des dänisch-deutsch-polnischen Korps', <http://www.bmvg.de/sicherheit/030509_multinationales_korps.php> (accessed 11 November 2003).
- ¹⁶ Tim Donnelly, 'Rethinking NATO', *NATO Review in the Wake of Iraq*, <<http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2003/issue2/english/art2.html>> (accessed 11 November 2003).
- ¹⁷ See *TIME magazine* special edition, March 31, 2003: "The administration missed what was happening in Europe. In the summer 2002, to save his skin in federal elections, German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder came out against military action in Iraq under any circumstances. He and Chirac had long had chilly relations, but last fall the French and German governments began to work toward a set of common positions on a variety of issues. For the French, this was vital. With Germany set to take a seat on the Security Council in January, Paris would no longer be facing the Americans alone".
- ¹⁸ An interesting question regarding the French-German Duo seems to be, who uses whom more in the end: France–Germany, or Germany–France? Former foreign policy advisor to Chancellor Helmut Kohl, Joachim Bitterlich, argued that, given recent French diplomacy in EU, NATO and UN, France had achieved to reclaim its position as 'country number one' in Europe: 'Frankreich, die Nummer eins', <<http://www.welt.de>> February 18, 2003.
- ¹⁹ In summary, recent splits in the EU, NATO and UN seemed to have weakened the ability of the international community to use successfully the threat of force as a means of preventive diplomacy in the Iraq crisis. The fact that individual members in the transatlantic community – in EU and NATO, or not – have not been able to streamline their policy on Iraq during the last year, did not increase the chances for preventive diplomacy. An intervention in Iraq has thus in the end become more, not less, likely.
- ²⁰ *BBC News*, April 30 2003: "Diplomatic warfare breaks out in NATO after a call by France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg for the creation of headquarters and planning staff from which a purely European Union based defense might emerge."
- ²¹ Michael Stürmer, 'Hans-Ulrich Klose ist sich nicht sicher, ob Deutschland eine Außenpolitik hat', *DIE WELT*, 17.07.2003;
- ²² Concerning EU's ability to act together, the example of the International Criminal Court may illustrate how rapidly EU cohesion gives way to bi-lateral relations. When the EU Commission threatened Eastern European countries they would endanger future EU membership if supporting US demands to provide ICC exemptions for its peacekeepers, Central and Eastern European countries choose NATO membership and good relations with the US over possible EU membership. Also, Western European countries like Great Britain, Spain and Italy granted the US these exemptions, thereby breaking ranks with Germany.
- ²³ Those challenges concern so-called soft- and hard power operations, and new and old threats. See Michaela Hertkorn (2002), *Why Conflict Prevention does not Exclude the Use of Force* (Mensch und Buch Verlag: Berlin).
- ²⁴ Personal interview with a representative of the "New Atlantic Agenda" project, American Enterprise Institute, Washington DC, June 3, 2003;
- ²⁵ For statistics on missions abroad, see: <<http://www.bundeswehr.de/forces/einsatzzahlen.php>> (accessed 11 November 2003)
- ²⁶ 'Resolution der CDU/CSU-Fraktionsvorsitzenden der Deutschen Länderparlamente und des Deutschen Bundestages sowie des Vorsitzenden der EVP-ED-Fraktion im Europäischen Parlament zum Verteidigungsgipfel von Deutschland, Frankreich, Belgien und Luxemburg', 29.04.2003; 'Beschluß des Bundesvorstandes vom 28.04.2003: Die Außenpolitischen Interessen Deutschlands: Stabilität durch Partnerschaft und Vertrauen.
- ²⁷ Michaela Hertkorn, *Why Conflict Prevention Does not Exclude the Use of Force* (Mensch & Buch Verlag: Berlin, 2002); Michaela Hertkorn, 'Defining Preventive Diplomacy in Europe: September 11 and its Impact on the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy', in David Carment/Albrecht Schnabel, *Conflict Prevention: From Rhetoric to Policy* (Lexington: 2004 forthcoming).
- ²⁸ Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Die einzige Weltmacht. Amerikas Strategie der Vorherrschaft*, (Fischer: Berlin), 1997.
- ²⁹ 'The Many Faces of Joschka Fischer', *BBC online*, April 8, 2003: Joschka Fischer was "the most determined opponent of the Anglo-American project" – before Jacques Chirac.
- ³⁰ Other questions are: What should be Germany's real contribution to help NATO deal with regional conflicts and terrorist threats, given its limited defense budget? What can Germany with the largest population in EU do to deliver on closing the capabilities gap? Maintaining the ability to work and fight together as Allies requires NATO member states to take the necessary steps to modernize their national forces. Here lies a specific challenge for Germany.
- ³¹ Lawrence Korb on US troops deploying from Germany, OPED, *New York Times*, August 1, 2003; Information obtained during personal interview with representative at American Enterprise Institute, June 3, 2003.
- ³² Which left Germany isolated in Europe, after its recognition of Slovenian and Croatian independence.
- ³³ 'Rot-Grün will Wehrpflicht überprüfen', *tageschau.de*, October 7, 2002; 'Rumsfeld geht auf Distanz bei NATO-Treffen – Struck glaubt an Normalisierung', *DPA*, September 24, 2002. While German contribution to Afghanistan led to a vote of confidence in Germany's parliament by late 2001, Schröder's anti-American rhetoric concerning military action against Iraq in summer 2002 can be seen in the following light. The Social-Democratic-

Green coalition government might not have survived its support of another military intervention. Schröder's decision however, to sacrifice relationships with the US will come at a long-term price regarding the maneuverability of German foreign policy. How was NATO seriously to decide upon a German-Dutch ISAF command in Afghanistan, when US Secretary of Defense and German Defense Minister did not even talk with each other at NATO's Ambassador meeting in Poland in September 2002, and Germany missed to inform the Dutch government about its proposition? Still during the Kosovo intervention, Germany's Foreign Minister struggled to draw a line between the two principles: 'no more war' versus 'no more genocide'. Post 9/11, Schröder offered military support to the US. How solid German 'unconditional support' would prove, if the war against terrorism lingered on or stretched to other countries, like Iraq, promised to be interesting already by early 2002.

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