Erstellt am: 25.12.2005 Autor: Dustin Dehéz Status: Senior
Terrorism and Piracy – the Threat Underestimated at the Horn of Africa
In 2002 a small vessel hit the French oil tanker Limburg, setting it on fire. Back in 2000 the USS Cole was attacked in Yemen by another small boat carrying explosives. Recently ships belonging the World Food Programme transporting food relief to Somalia have been hijacked by pirates. All these incidents hold a common lesson to be learned: the backbone of world trade, the waterways, are not in safe hands. In fact they are the Achilles heal of our economic system.
The most dangerous waterways are off the coast of Nigeria, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Somalia. In November 2005 Somali pirates tried to enter the cruiser “Seabourne Spirit” that was passing the Somali coast. Although being forced to withdraw by a ship owned Long Range Acoustic Device (LRAD), a newly developed acoustic weapon, the attack showed how dangerous the seas near Somalia still are. Piracy is still a scourge and the attack on the “Seabourne Spirit” is only the icing on the cake. The International Maritime Organisation reports some 4.000 piracy related incidents since 1990, but many shipping companies do not report piracy incidents as these reports would increase their insurance rates. Some observers believe that the real figure is somewhat between 8.000 and 20.000 incidents. What is striking, however, is the fact that piracy at the Horn of Africa could not be contained by the maritime presence of coalition forces, so that the International Maritime Organisation had to call for action on piracy off Somalia recently. The failure to counter piracy on the Horn of Africa coincides with the failure to enforce the United Nations arms embargo on Somalia. So far, this breakdown has hurt interests in conflict resolution in Somalia, but in the future it might very well lead to more serious problems: What if terrorist and pirates begin to follow a common agenda at the Horn of Africa?
The Core of the Problem: State Failure in Somalia
Increasing piracy at the Horn is largely due to increased troubles for local fishermen. When in 1991 the government of Siad Barre was ousted Somalia lost control of its waters. In the following years foreign vessels invaded the Somali waters frequently for fishing, destroying the livelihoods of many local fishermen, leading directly to a dirty war between young fishermen and the foreign trawlers. Armed incidents and the sinking of the smaller Somali boats became regular. Somali fishermen were responding to the rising violence by slowly adapting piracy tactics in what has now developed internal dynamics. Somalia’s economy, that is best described as neither formal nor informal , still exports fish. Although livestock export is by far the most important export sector, some 2.600 tonnes of fish had been exported in 2003 creating estimated revenues of about US $ 3.4 million. Along the coastline of Southern Somalia downwards from Mogadishu to the city of Kismayo were Somali waters neighbour those of Kenya thousands of local people are still dependent on fishing. The breakdown of central statehood in Somalia led to anarchy off the coast preparing the ground for regular incursions of foreign fish-trawlers and thereby leading to more pirate activity. Still, these foreign incursions are illegal and could have been stopped easily by the international community through better monitoring of sea movements.
The Backbone of International Trade: Chokepoints
Security at the Horn of Africa is of particular concern to the global economy: 3.3 million barrel oil per day are passing this chokepoint. A terrorist attack at the street of the Bab el-Mandab would harm the international economy in many ways:
- Transport fares would rise immediately as tankers and ships were to take alternative routes. Depending on the precise location of an eventual attack, major oil tankers could be forced to take different routes to their final destinations. If these ships were to avoid the Red Sea, they would have to take the alternative route by sailing all around Africa. A trip that would cost days and as transport capacities are already limited, extended trips would further reduce available transport capacities at the international trade and oil markets, thus leading to sharp rises in transport fares.
- Rising transport fares would be accompanied by rising insurance fares. As incidents involving pirate activity have not been reported in the past and/or have not attracted international attention, a serious incident involving pirates and/or terrorist would lead to a rise in insurance rates that in turn would be handed to the customer and therefore would lead to a further rise in transport fares.
- The most serious result would be a major rise in oil prices. Not only that the shipping of oil would become more expansive. If huge oil tankers have to round all of Africa in order to avoid the chokepoints in the Gulf of Aden and the Suez Canal a gap in crude oil supply would be the consequence as ships would need more time to reach their destinations in Europe and the United States. Although the International Energy Agency would intervene in order to save the oil price, a rise in prices would be inevitable. A price increase of one dollar per barrel costs the U.S. economy alone some US $ 7.4 billion each year. If the most important choke point had to close temporarily a double digit price increase in oil seems only realistic.
Conclusion
Piracy and terrorism could easily harm the international economy, by targeting the world’s oil markets. There are three major threats for world oil supply:
- an embargo of one or more large oil producing countries, notably Iran;
- market turbulences by unrest in an oil producing country, notably Nigeria or Saudi-Arabia or by natural disasters (as had the recent hurricanes Katrina and Rita in the United States);
- and finally an interference in the logistical network of the international sea trade routes through piracy and/or terrorism.
80% of the total world trade is currently being shipped on the oceans. Especially the Street of Hormuz, the Suez-Canal, the Bab el-Mandab are choke points that are largely unpoliced, easy to penetrate and very vulnerable. In other words: They provide an inviting target.
In the past pirates – as a form of organised crime – and terrorist have learned from one another, organised crime has adopted terrorist cell structures, while terrorist have improved their abilities in money laundering. So far terrorist and pirates have followed different goals, although employing similar methods. Pirates tend to enrich themselves, while terrorists aim to attack the United States and its allies and are therefore willing to spend money. But the different end in their agendas could exactly offer the link that could cause troubles for the international community. What if terrorist employ pirates to carry out the attacks? What if pirates act as mercenaries of international terrorism? A danger that is looming in Somalia, where connections between pirates and terrorists belonging to Al-Ittihad Al-Islamiya could easily materialise.
46.000 ships are sailing on the oceans to supply the global economy and the number is still rising. Over the last decade the number of piracy-related attacks has tripled. But for the time being the international community has not responded to the problem. The maritime presence of the Joint Task Force Horn of Africa in Djibouti has not stopped piracy at the Horn. Despite the presence of coalition forces at the Bab el-Mandab most waterways are badly policed. A terrorist attack on the international trade routes is only a question of time.
