Introduction

During the last two years, European-US – and in particular - German-US relations were examined. Main focus of research was put on issues of potential tensions between the Allies, and the following three phases were identified: the pre-Bush, the Bush and the post-9/11-Bush phase.

1. The so-called pre-Bush phase dealt with the following case studies: The long-term stabilization in the Balkans and a common European foreign and security policy (including ESDP, the European Security and Defense Policy). Questions addressed included: Are the Allies drifting apart? Does the US want Germany to play a stronger role in EU and NATO? How are such expectations perceived in Germany?

2. The so-called Bush-phase lasted from the presidential election of President Bush to September 11, 2001, including the first two visits of President Bush to Europe in early summer 2001. Main case studies were missile defense and NATO enlargement.
Before the first two visits of Bush to Europe in early summer 2001, the author of this paper anticipated, the US administration might need Germany in EU and NATO because of Germany’ s partnership with France and its excellent relations with Russian President, Vladimir Putin. However, by summer 2001, the Bush administration entered Europe via Spain and Italy, were warmly welcomed, and Britain – once saddened about the former Clinton-Blair axis - had already turned around. Furthermore, the sudden rapprochement of Putin and Bush on NATO enlargement and missile defense came as a surprise to German political elites! Having charmed Britain, Spain and Italy, the core assumption of this paper needed to be changed: The Bush administration could bypass Germany and France (with whom, meaning France, at least they worked closely together in Macedonia). The continuing flare up of German anti-Bush-anti-Americanism in news and journals seemed to isolate Germany with regard to its relations to the US, already back in July/August 2001.
This assessment served as basis for further analysis post-9/11.

3. The so-called post-9/11-Bush phase started on September 11, 2001, a date, which arguably changed parameters defining transatlantic relations one more time.
Policy issues of tensions between partners on both sides of the Atlantic, like the Kyoto protocol, missile defense or burden sharing, suddenly were not on top of the transatlantic agenda anymore. Germany declared its post-World War II era over and NATO was confronted with its first case of collective defense.
NATO had not yet officially declared to renew its relationship with Russia. However, by autumn 200I, “NATO for-ever-transformed” became the major case study of this research project.
Why this? All former case studies could be subsumed under NATO’ s role in peacemaking and peacekeeping, like in the Balkans. NATO would be of relevance for further rapprochement with Russia and the war against global terrorism. On a September 2002 meeting of NATO Ambassadors in Poland, Allies discussed enlargement and how to streamline their capabilities. NATO’ s Transformation Declaration of October 6, 2002, furthermore stated NATO would go global where the threat was – also based on UN resolutions. The US proposition to create a NATO reaction force, which was accepted at NATO’ s November Summit in Prague, will probably have a lasting and weakening impact on EU rapid reaction forces.

Germany – in all likelihood – has been one of the unhappiest countries about these developments. While the UK always has perceived ESDP incorporated in NATO, Germany may have regarded ESDP as ultimate soft-power alternative to NATO. France arguably has been suspicious about US leadership role in NATO for many years, and may have hoped for ESDP to create hard-power alternatives to NATO.

In the post-9/11-Bush-phase, the following questions were of interest: What will happen to issues of tensions between European countries, like particularly Germany, and the US in the longer run? What can European partners, like Germany contribute to a coalition against terrorism and a multinational peacekeeping force? What domestic constraints exist for Germany’ s current government coalition?
Ultimately after 9/11, for the Germans, one challenge seemed to be clear: they had to acknowledge and shoulder more hard power responsibility.
With regard to the US, ultimately after 9/11, Americans acknowledged their need for allies, and ever since then, expressed the wish for creating new and strengthening old alliances. .

Right in the aftermath of Sep 11, Europeans and Germans asked themselves: Are we all Americans? Would 9/11 strengthen European commitment in NATO or a so-called common European foreign and security policy? The fact that Turkey took over the lead of the International Stabilization Force in Afghanistan (ISAF) – after the UK – arguably reflected the strengthening of NATO, with Turkey being in NATO, but not in EU. After the Prague Summit, it seemed NATO was strengthened further, given the accession of seven new members in Central and Eastern Europe, next to plans how to streamline NATO capabilities. On the other side, the recent blockage of NATO to provide Turkey with defensive weapons was – of course - troubling. While NATO finally overcame this blockage, current tensions between the US administration and the Turkish government seem to point at more trouble on the transatlantic horizon.
With regard to EU, and whether it can be strengthened as an organization, will largely depend on how it manages its own enlargement process and constitutional changes. In recent weeks, the world witnessed once more the inability of EU members to speak with a common voice. Each time EU tried to achieve some consensus on Iraq, the declarations were based on minimalist common ground.
The example of the International Criminal Court (ICC) also illustrates how rapidly EU cohesion has given way to bi-lateral relations. When EU Commission threatened Eastern European countries, they would endanger their future EU membership if meeting US demands to provide exemptions for its peacekeepers, Eastern European countries choose NATO membership and good relations with the US over possible EU membership. The same was true for Western European countries, when Great Britain, Spain and Italy granted the US these exemptions, thereby mostly breaking ranks with Germany, which still kept insisting (together with Chris Patten at the Commission of EU), the US needed to submit to the ICC. This is the more perplexing, given the fact that the German government has been discussing itself, whether they should seek exemptions for their own peacekeepers in Afghanistan, too.

What happened to German-US relations since 9/11? The following arguments will try to provide an answer, while highlighting the particular issue of Iraq
German Ambassador Wolfgang Ischinger on December 11, 2001 characterized US-German relations as follows: “I cannot remember a time, when that relation was better”. On his first arrival in Washington in July 2001, the relationship had not been that good: “Your president was not given such good description in European media. We were faced with many problems, like the Kyoto protocol. After 9/11, I am faced with second-rate problems”.
Ambassador Ischinger had the following suggestion for the US administration: “Being a world power brings many blessings. The question is not, how can you avoid, to be hated, but how can you soften things? Whenever you intervene, you will hurt somebody’s interest. You cannot avoid that. The recipe – from a German perspective – is: what you did in post-2nd-World-War era in Germany and Japan. The UN was your creation. Use them! Set good examples. You’ll get maximum respect and maybe some love!”

Then, in January 2002, German Foreign Minister, Joschka Fischer declared with regard to US policy on Iraq: “We won’t be treated as satellites.” In an interview with the desk officer for EU at the German Embassy in Washington DC, by the end of March, 2002, the author of this paper was told: “What concerns Iraq, we’ re just not playing as the US wishes us to do!” During interviews in Berlin at Stiftung für Wissenschaft und Politik (a German think tank) by Mid April 2002, experts on the US shared the following view: “Global terrorism concerns the US, not Germany and not Europe.”
Israel and Iraq clearly emerged as major conflict issues between the US administration and the current German government in spring and summer 2002.
The speech of President Bush in the Reichstag – the German parliament - in Berlin on May 23, 2002 was arguably an attempt to bridge the gap between the US and German political elites on the issue of Iraq and the Middle East as a whole. He promised German Chancellor, Gerhard Schröder not to put Iraq on top of his foreign policy agenda before German federal elections in September 2002, and was given Schröder’ s assurance, Germany would not openly oppose US policy on Iraq. Obviously, this promise was later broken for domestic policy concerns.
What followed was Schröder arguing in summer 2002, Germany would not be pulled into “US American adventures” or “click heels”. He also highlighted the necessity of a German path (‘Sonderweg’). This did not only cause irritation in Washington, but also – and this cannot be stressed enough - made other European allies wonder about Germany’ s reliability.
The proposal of French President, Jacques Chirac of early September 2002, to still bridge the gap between European allies and the US on Iraq, and the strong support by British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, could have alarmed Schröder and Fischer of the following. The US might in deed have proof on Iraq having weapons of mass destruction, and linking it somehow to Al Qeada. Another alarming sign for Germany to be on the road to isolation in EU and NATO – later arguably together with France - could have been Italy, Spain and Poland rapidly turning around and declaring support for the US.
An article in DIE WELT on September 27, 2002 stated, “NATO General Secretary, Lord Robertson, worries about the relations between Berlin and Washington. To stay away from the classified briefing by Rumsfeld at NATO meeting in Poland, as German Defense Minister Struck did, and then to express that there was no new proof available, does not show the Germans take the situation seriously enough.”
There seems to have been a certain pattern of “Vogelstraußpolitik” in German policy on Iraq, that – no matter what data was presented by allies – the German government kept its ultimate no to any use of force, be it based on a UN mandate or a coalition of the willing. For example, after a meeting between NATO General Secretary Robertson and Joschka Fischer in early September 2002, the German Foreign Minister declared: “one should not expect any change of policy on Iraq by the German government. Schröder and I have already made up our minds!” This attitude in the end prevailed: Before the inspectors made their report to the UN Security Council on January 27, 2003 the German government – together with France – opposed strongly any “war with Iraq” and stressed inspectors needed more time, (even though they both had endorsed serious consequences in resolution 1441). On February 5, 2003, before the presentation of US Secretary of State, Colin Powell in front of the Security Council, Schröder insisted publicly on his absolute “no against war”.

While US diplomatic efforts in late January and in February 2003 aimed at pulling Germany away from France, the common French-German-Russian Memorandum sealed German diplomatic and foreign policy options, or ultimately bound them to French national interests. At an emergency Summit of EU on February 17, 2003, old and new EU member states witnessed Chirac threatening Central and Eastern European countries, they would risk their future EU membership if they supported the US. A previous letter of eight European countries of January 30, 2003 had obviously infuriated Paris, because it precisely highlighted intra-European or intra-EU splits on Iraq, but also on other transatlantic issues. (Smaller) Western and Eastern European countries - in EU or not - obviously had started to ask the obvious question, whether Germany and France actually should be allowed to impose their concept(s) of further European integration on Europe or EU as a whole. This stand by European countries in East and West seems to illustrate two things: There is no such thing than a functioning common European foreign and security policy, and Europe is much more than EU.

With regard to Germany, the following needs to be highlighted on the specific issue of Iraq:
Not every representative of Germany’ s governing parties supported the government’ s course on Iraq! Hans Ulrich Klose, a foreign policy expert with the Social Democrats, declared - for example in the Hamburger Tagblatt - in July 2002: “Attack on Iraq: Bundeswehr will be present.” He was convinced the German army would participate, and such an attack would not even need another UN mandate. In recent weeks, Germany’ s opposition started to come out publicly against Schröder’ s official government course. Angela Merkel of the largest opposition party, argued early February, she would have signed the letter of the eight European countries in support of the US.

Looking back, one unfortunate impact of troubled German-US relations, after Schröder’ s irresponsible election rhetoric, clearly has concerned the European theatre itself. What does this mean? Strong German-US relations contribute to intra-European stability. Without them, France started complaining about the too strong British influence in the transatlantic theatre, suggesting, EU could formulate its own common policy on Iraq, which would then isolate Great Britain. On the other side, after Schröder did not succeed in London by the end of September 2002, to get Tony Blair to help him restore US-German relations, Schröder’ s focus shifted across the Rhine, as to get France to join ranks to counter US-UK policy on Iraq.

These are – in the analysis of the author of this paper – the underlying dynamics of the diplomatic drama the world experienced on the issue of Iraq in recent months, within EU, NATO and UN.

TIME magazine expressed in its March 31, 2003 special edition: “The administration missed what was happening in Europe. In the summer 2002, to save his skin in federal elections, German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder came out against military action in Iraq under any circumstances. He and Chirac had long had chilly relations, but last fall the French and German governments began to work toward a set of common positions on a variety of issues. For the French, this was vital. With Germany set to take a seat on the Security Council in January, Paris would no longer be facing the Americans alone”.

While the argument was made before, that Germany’ s road to isolation has been going on for a while – since the so-called Bush-phase - and not exclusively on the issue of Iraq, the following summarizing explanation or interpretation, shall be provided.
By hiding behind “Europe” – meaning the so-called common European foreign and security policy - Germany keeps Europeanizing its foreign policy. Doing so, it actually stages EU for its own national purpose, sometimes together with France, sometimes alone. A somewhat fascinating question in this regard is: who will use whom more in the end: France Germany or Germany France? Whether French diplomatic efforts of recent weeks – to split the UN Security Council and hamper US-UK diplomatic efforts – should be regarded as brilliant, as some of my colleagues seem to do – in any case, they seem to be just as brilliant, as German diplomacy has been blind-folded.

The diplomatic stunts of recent weeks – by the French, German and Russian trio – seemed to have aimed at reversing NATO transformation (with the goals described before), at counter-balancing the US, and at hampering Germany’ s role as 2nd important partner to the US in Europe – next to Great Britain. It is clear, that such endeavors cannot be in Germany’ s own national interest. The German government within only a few months gave up on fundamental principles, which had been characterizing German foreign policy ever since the end of the 2nd World War and throughout the 1990s. Such principles have been for example: Never to go it alone; never to make the ultimate decision between Paris or Washington; never to get into a geo-political “two frontier situation” between Paris and Moscow – without other strong diplomatic ties with London and Washington. By buying into French plans how to reform the institutions of EU, Germany furthermore gave up its role to protect the interests of smaller EU countries within the Commission.

Holding on to such principles ever since the 1950s, allowed Germany to continuously mature into its growing role as partner in EU and NATO, under US leadership and under US protection throughout and in the aftermath of the Cold War. French-German partnership was initiated by the United States. German Reunification was possible only with the strong support of the US. If calls of Schröder for Germany to become a “normal” country, mean nothing else but the discontinuity of a functioning foreign policy ever since the end of the 2nd World War, such “normalcy” misses what is truly at stake for democratic Germany as the largest country in EU.

Germany – positioned at the heart of Europe, between East and West – today risks, not to meet the security challenges of the 21st century and to share the burden as crucial ally in NATO and EU. To its neighbors, if one excludes France and Russia, Germany with its Social-Democratic and Green coalition government re-invented itself as problematic partner in the transatlantic relationship. This is the more tragic and unnecessary, given the obvious contribution by Germany to special-forces operations, and to ISAF in Afghanistan, as well as to other regions in crisis in recent months and years.

Some final remarks concerning what we are witnessing right now these days. The situation is still fluent, and it remains to be seen, how the post-conflict situation in Iraq and intra-European, as well as overall transatlantic relations will develop:

From a German point of view, it seems tragic that the 1968-generation – of all generations - has missed a great historic opportunity to help end a dictatorship. Whether and to which degree Germany will be involved in the post-conflict reconstruction and in the long-term transformation of Iraq into a stable and democratic society, is still open?
It was the 68-generation, which had confronted their fathers and mothers with the question: “where were you during Hitler’ s regime? Did you support or oppose Nazi tyranny?”
At the beginning of the 21st century, this generation of former rebels against (untested) authority (arguably of dictators), missed the chance to demonstrate that they learned the lessons of history and meant what they said, by actually applying it to real life.
Helga Haftendorn, an expert on German foreign policy, in a presentation at the German General Consulate in New York on April 8, stressed how distressed she felt given the anti-Americanism by the Schroeder government. She gave some credit to Joschka Fischer. However, a most interesting article on BBC online (April 8) pointed at “the many faces of Joschka Fischer”, and identifies him as “the most determined opponent of the Anglo-American project” – before Jacques Chirac. The German daily “DIE WELT” argued on April 10, German politicians were not comfortable with the Russian-French-German meeting in St. Petersburg this weekend. Representatives of the German government stressed in this regard, the meeting was mainly the result of pressure by Chirac, and “such format” would not “be planned/intended for long”.
So, has Germany already given up on the “axis of peace”, if one regards such title suitable? Other recent attributes for the trio were: “The coalition of the weasels”, the “coalition of the disgruntled”, and the “coalition of the opportunistic”.
The German government clearly realizes that enough damage was done; that they boxed themselves into a corner, out of which they could not escape without losing face domestically. These days, Germany’ s government seems to choose to wait until the smoke clears (at least, that’ s what the author of this conference paper was told at the German General Consulate in early April). The German opposition party of the Christian Democrats has another strategy – finally: Angela Merkel on April 3 in a speech in the German parliament introduced a “Plan to reshape, reformulate and refocus German foreign policy”, which needed to be based on 6 foreign policy issues (of core interest to German foreign policy). Wolfgang Schaeuble, foreign policy expert of the Christian Democrats, on April 7 during a presentation in Paris (at the Konrad Adenauer Foundation) expressed: A confrontation course against the US – together with France, or led by France – was not (I repeat was not) in the German national interest!

Public discourse in Germany arguably has been “poisoned” by the German government. We may quote Goethe: “the ghosts I called, I won’ t get rid of them now!” On the other side, parts of the political elites in Germany – within the opposition – seem to start to provide alternatives. This should and can comfort anybody in Germany (or elsewhere), to whom good German-US relations symbolize an intrinsic part to a solid transatlantic alliance!