Erstellt am: 16.11.2006 Autor: Michaela Hertkorn Status: Bisher nicht definiert
Out-of-Area Nation-Building and Stabilization: Germany as a Player within the NATO-EU Framework
On May 4, 2006, German Chancellor Angela Merkel held a speech in New York, emphasizing challenges for transatlantic economic ties. Other regional powers, such as China and India, would watch Europe and North America closely to see, whether the US and the European Union (EU), cooperated on a variety of issues concerning the global economy and international security. It was thus imperative for allies on both sides of the Atlantic not to let trade disputes, competing access to global markets or energy scarcity divide their unity – a unity based on common values, such as the appreciation of democracy. Four months later, the German chancellor proposed the bold idea of a future free-trade zone between Europe and the US. Such a move may be an indicator for how far rapprochement between Washington, DC and Berlin has come since the election of Merkel.[1]
More than three years after war in Iraq, the West is faced with yet another challenge in the Near East. For many years now, foreign policy issues that pertain to regions outside the North-Atlantic or European area, such as the Middle East, have generated the greatest tensions between North American and European allies. In the aftermath of war in Lebanon in 2006, the Atlantic community – comprised of member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) – faces considerable peacemaking and reconstruction challenges. Those challenges demand a long-term commitment in a region that used to be ‘out-of-area’ for NATO and the EU during the Cold War and the years that followed.
In the opening years of the 21st Century, transnational threats, such as global terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, are at top of the global agenda. Allies, whether in North America or Europe, will have to face them together. These threats become even more dire given the intensified competition for energy commodities especially in the age of globalization and the rise of regional powers, such as Iran.
Transatlantic tensions over Iraq have arguably affected intra-European relations and prospects for further European integration in a negative way, and they seem to have negatively affected the so-called ‘NATO transformation’ process in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, too.
This paper has a three-fold focus. It analyzes Germany’s potential as a player within the so-called NATO-EU framework outlined above, to contribute to international peace-building missions.
We will first explore characteristics of contemporary German foreign and security policy, and address the potential of Germany to contribute to out-of-area peace missions now and in the future. Should Germany not benefit from its own historic experience with a successful post-World War II reconstruction process? What are the lessons the international community can learn from the ‘German case’?
Another important, second aspect of this paper deals with NATO’s increasing role in post-conflict peace- and nation-building. In the 1990s, NATO provided leadership for peacekeeping missions in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. Nowadays, NATO leads the International Stabilization Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan and has been envisioning a common role for Iraq providing troop training. Does NATO therefore have the potential to transform itself into the kind of permanent stand-by force, envisioned in chapter seven of the United Nations Charter?
Third, given the centrality of the concept of nation- and peace-building to this paper, some of the challenges in post-conflict situations shall be highlighted. Important questions are how to create lasting stability, or, how to enable a viable peace, thus ultimately winning it?
The challenges in question concern the establishment of security after an intervention and throughout a long-term reconstruction and peace process. Corresponding training, which includes a variety of actors from both civilian and military organizations and which draws from the theoretical and practical expertise of different actors, is also imperative. As a particularly crucial issue in any post-settlement process, closest possible cooperation is called for in the civil-military interface.
How relevant these issues and theoretical deliberations are, becomes apparent, when we look at concrete case studies, such as the long-term stabilization in the Balkans, or nowadays, the challenge of lasting peace and stability in the Middle East. Concerning long-term stabilization, an important question is, whether the Atlantic community that consists of NATO and EU members, will be willing to commit itself (again, and again, and again), to post-conflict nation- and peace-building in the Near East, Iraq and Afghanistan; regions whose problems are inter-twined with the threat of global terrorism?
NATO Generals in Afghanistan in early September 2006 called for NATO member states to provide more troops to contain the resurgence of the Taliban. With Europeans engaged in the Democratic Republic of Congo and providing the bulk of peacekeeping troops in Southern Lebanon, NATO and EU member states alike increasingly seem to be stretched thin. Calls for an increased NATO role in Sudan seem to complicate the situation further. This paper will try to make the case that, whether NATO or EU-members lead international peace-building efforts, it apparently is the overall EU-NATO framework, which increasingly enables and empowers international peacekeeping.
1. The Continued Relevance of Constructive German-US Relations: The Merkel-Impact in Europe and Beyond
The following part will outline some of the challenges Germany has been facing as a regional power and player in Europe. To which extent will the country play a constructive role to help facilitate and strengthen EU-NATO co-operation? After the change in government of 2005, will Germany still use some of its influence within EU to counter-balance the US, together with France; a process the international community witnessed during pre-war negotiations concerning Iraq at the United Nations in 2002 and 2003?
In the analysis of the author of this paper, troubled US-German relations, particularly – though not exclusively – on the issue of Iraq, had their problematic impact in two main areas. First, they added to divisions within the so-called intra-European theatre and within EU. Second, they negatively affected so-called NATO transformation in accordance with the 2002 Istanbul Transformation Declaration mentioned before, which envisioned a global peacekeeping and peace-building role for the alliance and called for the streamlining of its capabilities, while closely working together with other international and regional organizations, such as especially the EU.
Given the sheer number of out-of-area missions to which member states of NATO and EU increasingly contribute, it seems it cannot be a matter of either, or, whether countries that belong to both, EU and NATO, contribute (more) to NATO, or alternatively, focus on strengthening the so-called common European foreign and security policy (CFSP). How well members within the so-called NATO-EU framework in the end coordinate all their efforts and contributions to international peace missions, will have an impact ultimately, how well allies on both sides of the Atlantic can adapt to a new global security environment that is characterized by transnational threats.
How can we characterize German foreign policy and US-German bi-lateral relations, today in 2006? Germany’ s first female Chancellor, Angela Merkel, after coming to power in late 2005, seems to have re-focused some of Germany’s bi-lateral relations, such as with the US, France, Russia, China, and vis-a-vis Israel and the Palestinian Authority – referring to the aid the latter has been receiving from EU.
The Merkel-impact in Europe and beyond became obvious when Germany, like the US and Great Britain withstood the call by the international community and EU for an immediate ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon. Interesting too, when President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of Iran sent a letter to Chancellor Merkel, she did not respond, nor was the letter made public because of its anti-Semitic language and denial of the Holocaust. The Israeli proposal to have NATO provide robust peacekeeping in an eventual buffer zone in Southern Lebanon came after the visit of Germany’ s Foreign Minister, Frank-Walter Steinmeier to the region. Having overcome strong transatlantic tensions over war in Iraq, the question now is, whether the Western alliance can sustain its re-found unity in the light of ongoing war in the Near East and the challenges posed by Iran – a regime in pursuit of nuclear proliferation despite international pressure, and in support of Hezbollah and the destruction of Israel? It seemed, to increase the prospect for lasting and viable peace in the Near and Middle East, EU and potentially NATO would have to cooperate in the most constructive way possible and use their full skill-set in peace-building and reconstruction. Judy Dempsey argued that, “some members [of NATO are] wary of role in buffer zone. Any NATO role would need an official request from both Israel and the Lebanese governments. If such a request were made, it would put NATO under immense pressure to say yes, provided it operated under a UN mandate and its role and duration was clearly defined”. (Dempsey, 2006).
An important question however has been from the outset, whether robust NATO peacekeeping – or, alternatively a robust contribution by EU member states to a multinational peacekeeping force in Southern Lebanon would endanger NATO’ s support to the African Union in Sudan, or even NATO’ s robustness in Afghanistan? After all, troops pledged within for an EU mission at one point in time, will contribute to a NATO peace mission at another moment. In any case, in August 2006, in Potsdam, Germany, where the headquarters of the EU-led mission to the Democratic Republic of Congo is located, French and Germany military early on discussed EU peacekeeping in Southern Lebanon. France instantly had raised scepticism with regard to NATO leading a potential multinational force in Southern Lebanon, while especially Israel had preferred NATO over EU for its robustness. “France has opposed, but failed to stop NATO from expanding ‘out of area’ beyond its traditional base of Europe to Afghanistan in 2002, to Sudan, where the alliance is involved in airlift operations, and to Iraq, where it is training military officers. France sees those developments as turning NATO into a toolbox for the Americans at the expense of preserving some European identity of the alliance”. (Dempsey, 2006)
Was the transatlantic alliance going to experience another round of ‘NATO-EU-in-house-fighting’, whether Europeans should strengthen their own common European security and defense policy (ESDP) as in the aftermath of Kosovo in 1999? Alternatively, whether Europe should counterbalance US American hyper-puissance, as happened in 2002 and 2003 over the issue of war in Iraq, which divided the transatlantic alliance and Europe? In this case, managing the aftermath of war in Lebanon would put at risk the same transatlantic unity that had been re-established in the light of challenges posed by the Iranian regime. Edward Luttwak argued accordingly, “the US and Europe are united this time, and can effectively cut off Iran from world banking, bar Iranian leaders from traveling to the West, and stop exports to Iran of everything but food and medicine”. (Luttwak, 2006, page 24)
Concerning Germany, the request by Israeli Prime Minister, Ehud Olmert for the Bundeswehr to contribute to a potential peace force in Southern Lebanon – based on a corresponding UN mandate – initially put a number of government representatives in Berlin in a tight spot. A spokesperson to the German Ministry of Defense declared that the Israeli request was problematic. The peace mission in question would exceed typical UN blue helmets, but require foreign military forces to disarm Hezbollah. Neither Europeans in general, nor Germans in particular were in a position or capable of doing that. If the statement were correct, it would render the so-called European security and defense policy (ESDP) obsolete. Why creating and supporting a rapid reaction force of 60.000 European stand-by troops if they cannot assume robust tasks, and are unwilling to enforce peace if necessary? The question, whether and to which extent ESDP might decuple from NATO, duplicate its structures or discriminate against NATO members that are not in EU, such as Turkey, caused intense transatlantic debate back in 1999 and 2000. This followed NATO’ s military intervention in Kosovo, whether ESDP might run the risk to decuple from NATO, to duplicate NATO assets, or discriminate against NATO members that are not in EU, such as Turkey.
Shall the international community conclude that Europeans still have cold feet, as soon as the going gets rough? Can the German government excuse itself from contributing to a peace force in the Near East, on grounds of Germany’ s World War II history? Germany has for a long time opted to Europeanize its foreign policy, while abdicating power politics and resorting to a convenient pretext of pacifism. Such attitude, however risks being inadequate in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, and for a country that will have to assume a decisive leadership role in Europe and abroad, given its economic potential. The following quote from a 2003 publication further highlights the previous thoughts:“Does Germany hide behind Europe, while keeping Europeanizing its foreign policy? Does it promote its concept of further European integration – in the form of a federate super-state – to use EU for its own national purpose, sometimes together with France, sometimes alone? In contrast to a more nationalistic France pursuing its foreign policy openly: Is the soft-power oriented German coalition government trying to avoid more hard power responsibility and burden-sharing foremost in NATO? Why should such policy be able to empower EU after all? The answer is, it cannot and will not: If Germany as largest EU member is at risk not to meet the security challenges as a sovereign member of the Atlantic community in the 21st century, this concerns EU (and NATO) as a whole. The Atlantic alliance with EU and NATO at its core would not but be weakened by Berlin’ s unwillingness to (further) modernize its Army, to contribute more peacemaking and robust peacekeeping to the Alliance’ s most trusted security organization, which is NATO, and to actively support the closest possible cooperation of EU and NATO.” (Hertkorn, 2003, page 7)
Back in 1997, Zbigniew Brzezinski identified Germany and the US as main proponents of NATO enlargement and raised the question, what an ever closer relationship between reunified Germany and the US meant to France, which was geo-strategically weakened by an eastward shift of Europe’ s center. During a visit to Paris in July 2005 – months before she was elected Germany’s new Chancellor from the former Eastern part of the country – Angela Merkel expressed the special ‘axis’ between Paris-Berlin-Moscow, created in the winter of 2002/2003 over the issue of war in Iraq, would cease to exist with her in the Bundeskanzleramt. Although German-French relations were essential to so-called European integration, they should not be at the expense of other allies and neighbors in Eastern and Western Europe. In the words of Theo Sommer, the German Chancellor, made an “impressive debut on the world stage… In the White House, Merkel left no doubt that she considers close ties across the Atlantic as imperative in today’ s globalized world as they were at the height of the Cold War. She is serious about improving ‘the quality of Western policy deliberations and decision-making. And she insists, as all previous German chancellors have: ‘European integration and Atlantic partnership are not at odds.’” (Sommer, 2006)
Having observed exemplary statements by Chancellor Merkel concerning both, European integration and transatlantic relations, we can assume that she will in all likelihood pursue a German foreign policy that sees integration of Germany in Europe closely inter-twined with strong transatlantic ties, and that she will try to avoid making a decision in favor of either, or. Merkel’s foreign policy so far seems to be characterized by both pragmatism and idealism. For example, she insisted that Germany’s economy needed the import of Russian gas. Therefore, the gas deal cut by former Chancellor Gerhard Schröder with Russian President Vladimir Putin, to build a pipeline through the Baltic Sea, which had offended Poland and the Baltic states, was not off the table. Germany would, however, invite the four European neighbors to join the energy project. After Merkel’s first visit to Washington, DC as German Chancellor by Mid January 2006, observers noted that the tone had changed.
While the issue of Guantánamo was raised by the German Chancellor, she generally supported what she called the ‘freedom agenda’, highlighting during a personal conversation with the American President her own experience in the Eastern part of a formerly divided Germany, which had suffered under Soviet rule.
In an article titled ‘Close Partners in Peace’, the German Chancellor stated with regard to German reunification in 1990: “The United States of America had “played a vital role in achieving German unity and creating a free Europe. Without the unreserved support by President George Bush sr. for the right of the German people to reunite in peace, Germany would very likely not have been able to embark on the road to unity… German-US relations and close transatlantic cooperation over the past 60 years have been based on a shared set of values and mutual trust. We see ourselves as partners. This does not mean we agree on everything, but our dialogue is conducted in a spirit of partnership and amity” (Merkel, 2006, page 1).
It seems that issues, such as the involvement of German intelligence officers in Baghdad before the war in Iraq, rendition practice by the CIA on German territory, or secret CIA prisons - long suspected for instance on Polish and Rumanian territory – clearly caused very critical headlines within the German, European or American press. On the other hand, the problems in question did not jeopardize the general trend that relations had changed for the better. And, this should – again – have a two-fold impact: Positive developments among Germans and Americans would affect intra-European dynamics and cohesion; and, they would affect – notably quite positively – NATO transformation. While Germany still will not send peacekeeping troops to Iraq, for example, it has stopped its outspoken opposition to a possibly larger role for NATO peacekeeping or training in Iraq.
In a speech at the American Council on Germany on March 21, 2006, Friedbert Pflüger, Deputy Defense Minister of Germany emphasized Chancellor Merkel had made clear, that NATO came first. There would be no separate alliances or axes any longer. What had changed was the tone. When Schröder and Bush spoke, it was a sensation. Now, when Germany and the US discussed Iran, there was again real cooperation. May we therefore conclude that German-American bi-lateral – and with it transatlantic - relations have successfully been mended for good? Which international or regional crises, such as in the Near East or Middle East, could possibly undo re-gained territory in this regard? Alternatively, might the crises at hand have the potential to strengthen the Atlantic community in the end?
In addition to transatlantic and intra-European dynamics influencing German foreign policy options, to which extent do domestic problems and politics shape and determine it? On August 5, 2006, Gernot Erler, a representative of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs - the Auswärtige Amt - and a member of the Social-Democratic Party stated that military involvement of the Bundeswehr as part of a multi-national peace force in Southern Lebanon was unforeseeable in the light of German history. It was difficult to imagine German soldiers facing Israeli soldiers. Nevertheless, Erler could imagine German soldiers assisting with the training of Lebanese forces. General tensions among the two main parties constituting Germany’s current ‘grand coalition’ of Christian and Social Democrats may put at risk not just domestic issues, but also affect certain aspects of Germany’s foreign policy agenda. We are left with two interesting questions. First, how maneuverable is German foreign policy currently? Second, can we use the historic argument precisely to call for a more decisive German foreign policy and for more contributions to global peacemaking? The following quote shall make the case: “While the argument can be made that Western Germany in the aftermath of World War II benefited from a complex political and economic reconstruction process, it also seems fair to pint out that this process had to be safeguarded militarily, arguably for four decades. Altogether, this allowed West Germany to transform its political culture or system from dictatorship to democracy. Given such first hand historical experience, Germany in fact does have the potential and does face the challenge to contribute more to complex reconstruction and peace(building) processes. However, the contributions in question should not and cannot exclusively focus on economic and political dimensions. They also need to focus on the military dimension, which guarantees safety during and in the aftermath of interventions, as well as throughout the long-term peace process. It is precisely the history of Germany, which enables it to play a constructive and active role together with its Allies and in the context of NATO and other regional organizations!” (Hertkorn, 2005, page 47)
2. Iraq, Iran and Lebanon: Which Crisis Next? A German – European Perspective
While the German contribution to EU election monitoring in the Democratic Republic of Congo certainly is a noble cause, the Near East and Middle East are closer to home, and of more concern to German foreign policy, its national security and therefore national interest. Though Africa is much too often neglected, and deserves more attention by the West - most of all in Sudan - European activities in the Republic of Congo also served the purpose to establish the EU as a military actor on the global map. The situation in the Middle East on the other hand is much more precarious. The dual threat of bi-lateral war between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon, and Iran facing international sanctions, thus probably using the crisis in the Near East to deflect from its own internal problems, make up for an explosive mix that concerns Europe theoretically more than the US, given Europe’s geographic proximity. Helmut Willmann, former General to the Bundeswehr came out in favor of a German contribution to a multi-national or international force. Germany undeniably had a unique historic responsibility vis-à-vis the nation-state of Israel. It was part of German Staatsraison to stand up for the right of existence of the Jewish state. It was going to be particularly difficult for the German government, which sent German troops to the Democratic Republic of Congo, to refuse its fair share to an international peace force in Southern Lebanon: “Ich kenne jedenfalls kaum einen Einsatz der Bundeswehr, der so sinnvoll und im nationalen Interesse Deutschlands läge wie einer zur Stabilisierung im Nahen Osten”.[4]
In addition to the challenge of reconstruction and stabilization in Lebanon, Iran, with its nuclear proliferation and support for Hezbollah, seems to be the biggest challenge or test case for enduring transatlantic ties. On March 21, 2006, Jessica Mathews in a New York Times article called for the international community, especially for Europe and North America to “speak to Tehran, with one voice”, so that the chances for deterring Iran be maximized (Matthews, 2006). While positive incentives – or carrots – may have been the focus of European diplomacy in the last three years, the potential of coercive diplomacy is increased with the US backing up European efforts while holding the stick. Language across the Atlantic in recent months suggested that diplomatic efforts have been closely coordinated. Le Monde, often a critical voice of American foreign policy, seemed to have gone out of its way to explain American foreign policy vis-à-vis Iran. In diverse April 2006 editions, for instance, Le Monde assured its readers that Washington remained committed to diplomatic dialogue, but that it needed to make sure that Tehran got the message and took negotiations seriously. Europeans seem to be worried about Iran and over developments in the wider Middle East. In an interview conducted with an advisor to former German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer in Berlin in January 2001, the author of this paper was told, “arguments between Washington and European allies over the (then new) Bush administration’ s plans for missile defense were largely of a rhetoric nature. After all, Germany and its neighbors needed to worry about Iraqi and Iranian capabilities to build weapons of mass destruction, more so than the US because of Europe’ s proximity to the Middle East”.[5]
Hans-Ulrich Klose, foreign policy expert of the Social-Democratic Party – one of the parties forming the current German coalition government – on August 31, 2006 expressed his concern about current global trends and the looming threat posed by Iran. Germany as other European partners could use their historic ties with countries in the Middle East to assist or complement US diplomacy. However, in the end, a nuclear Iran might not be preventable. The scenario more likely might be that of a ‘Cold war in the Middle East’, with the West and Iran’ s neighbors – most likely Saudi Arabia and Egypt – deterring and thus containing the regime in Tehran.[6]
So, what to do about Iran, if diplomacy were to fail? And, what does diplomatic failure mean? Josef Joffe in an article on ‘Oil, Sweat and Fears’ has identified four different fronts if the US were to attack and hit targets on the Iranian bomb-production chain: “…First, the attackers would have to cripple Iran’s air defense capabilities. Also, to prevent the Iranians from wreaking chaos in the global economy’ s lifeline – the Persian Gulf – by sinking tankers, America and its allies would need to neutralize coastal batteries and naval bases along a 1,000-mile coastline, the war’ s second front. The third front would be in Iraq, where Iranian Revolutionary Guards and Shiite militias would strike at an overextended US military presence. Doubling the 130.000 troops currently stationed there would hardly be enough. Finally, there would be the fourth, the global terrorism front, where Iran could score points using seasoned allies such as Hezbollah and Islamic Jihad…” (Joffe, 2006)
More than three years after war in Iraq, we may conclude, that the current Iraqi government has been engaging in post-war stabilization and reconciliation efforts, at the same time, ever more trouble seems to be brewing right next door to the Eastern border of Iraq, in Iran. This is one of the fundamental foreign policy dilemma, the international community and the West are dealing with right now. There is another dilemma, of an equally crucial nature. After underestimating the risks and limitations of (UN) peacekeeping in Somalia in the early 1990s, which led to the withdrawal of US peacekeepers, the wrong lessons were learned from the Somalia intervention with regard to the next humanitarian crisis on the horizon in Rwanda. Worried to be getting into another ‘quagmire’ without a clear exit strategy, the US decided not to commit troops to an international peacekeeping force, despite the warnings of Canadian Lieutenant General Romeo Dallaire, who insisted that a robust and sufficiently staffed peacekeeping force could prevent genocide in Rwanda.
The beginning of the 21st century witnessed a US-led intervention in Iraq effectively overthrowing a notorious regime. The reasons for preemptive military intervention that were presented to the international community and the United Nations on February 5, 2003, as we now know were based on incorrect assumptions and thus justification, namely that Iraq (still) possessed weapons of mass destruction. What exactly are the lessons, the international community, the US and its allies, will have learned from the Iraq intelligence debacle, now that the international community and the West are faced with the threat of nuclear proliferation and a dangerous regime in Tehran? An article in the New York Times can be quoted in this regard: “…American intelligence officials say the [intelligence] restrictions [for Iran] are particularly significant because their own assessments depend heavily on the agency’s findings. The reasons include the scarcity of human intelligence emerging from Iran, and suspicions about American intelligence after the failures in Iraq. ‘To build a public case, we need the international inspectors’, a senior administration official said. ‘The President knows that he cannot go out and give a speech describing our suspicions, not in this environment’…”[7]
A Foreign Affairs article of May/June 2006 concluded with regard to the role of false intelligence: “…Ironically, it now appears that some of the actions from Saddam’s new policy of cooperation actually helped solidify the coalition’ s case for war. Over the years, Western intelligence service had obtained many internal Iraqi communications, among them a 1996 memorandum from the director of the Iraqi Intelligence Service directing all subordinates to ‘insure that there is no equipment, materials, research, studies, or books related to manufacturing of the prohibited weapons (chemical, biological, nuclear, and missiles) in your site’. And, when UN inspectors went to these research and storage locations, they inevitably discovered lingering evidence of WMD-related programs. In 2000, therefore, when the United States intercepted a message between two Iraqi Republican Guard Corps commanders, discussing the removal of the words ‘nerve agents’ from ‘the wireless instructions’, or learned of instructions to ‘search the area surrounding the headquarters camp and [the unit] for any chemical agents, make sure the area is free of chemical containers, and write a report on it,’ US analysts viewed this information through the prism of a decade of prior deceit. They had no way of knowing that this time the information reflected the regime’ s attempt to ensure it was in compliance with UN resolutions.” (Woods, Lacey & Murray, 2006, page 7)
What does this mean? Foreign and security policy decisions, made by one ally concerning one crisis at one point of time, always leave a long-term impact on its allies and alliances. The decision by the United States to emphasize the concept of preemptive war vis-à-vis Iraq – though based on false or insufficient intelligence – will have an impact on how the alliance or the West will be able to prevent nuclear proliferation by Iran. Right after September 11, 2001, it seemed impossible that the US and any US administration would ever be able (again) to ignore or neglect softer elements of security policy, such as nation- and peace-building. And while the US (administration) finally seems to have learned the lesson that it cannot avoid peace and nation-building – or winning the peace – in addition to winning the war, Europeans – and thus, Germany – seem to be facing the truth that the threats of radical Islam and proliferation are very real, and that they concern Europe, too. “During the pre-Bush period, the US administration was pro-nation-building in Bosnia and Kosovo. Germany, on the other hand, still displayed a relatively strong anti-war attitude. Still, during the Kosovo intervention, Germany’ s Joschka Fischer struggled to walk the line between the principles of ‘no more war’ vis-à-vis ‘no more genocide’. During the Bush phase, the new administration claimed to be against nation-building and in early September 2001 – just before the September 11 attacks – even threatened the prolongation of NATO’ s mandate in Macedonia. Germany showed a relatively strong pro-interventionist attitude toward the crisis in Macedonia, even though Britain and France then clearly took the lead within EU. In the post-9/11/Bush phase, the US administration may not be able to avoid nation-building in its global war against terrorism. For Germany, Gerhard Schröder offered military support to the United States and its war in Afghanistan (although not in Iraq). To which extent Europe and particularly Germany would prove to remain on the American side, especially if the war was extended to other countries or would linger on, promised to be an interesting and open question throughout the post-9/11 Bush phase. The serious tensions and rifts over the United States approach to Iraq have confirmed that assumption…” (Hertkorn, 2004, page 32)
Whereas the focus of conflict prevention lies in the prevention of the outbreak of violence, preventive diplomacy as a tool with its coercive elements, also strives at preventing further regional escalation and the re-occurrence of violence. In that sense, conflict prevention is strongly linked with post-conflict peacekeeping and peace-building. Transatlantic relations, particularly in the late 1990s, served as the context to organize and coordinate peacekeeping in the Balkans, with EU and NATO as the main diplomatic, political and economic platforms in the absence of corresponding UN mandates.
3. The NATO-EU Framework for Peace- and Nation-Building Missions in the 21st Century
On November 19, 2002, the Parliamentary Assembly of NATO adopted the NATO Transformation Declaration. In this document, NATO formally endorsed out-of area mandates by stating that ‘NATO will go global where the threat is – also based on UN mandates’ (Istanbul Declaration, 2002). Of course NATO’s humanitarian role in peace and nation building missions first began in 1990s with its peacekeeping operations in the Balkans. Nowadays, NATO is leading the peacekeeping mission in Afghanistan, has planned for a joint role in Iraq, is providing logistical support for the African Union in Darfur, Sudan and flew aid to Kashmir in the aftermath of a devastating earthquake in 2005.
What are the geo-strategic implications of NATO – and, increasingly also the EU – as these organizations become global actors that will provide stability, engage in post-conflict nation-building and therefore in effect, facilitate the export of democracy on a global level to regions such as the wider Middle East or Central Asia? While NATO and the EU represent an alliance on the one hand and a regional organization on the other hand, established in the aftermath of World War II, the fact remains that an increasing number of individual states belong to both organizations. In 2004, ten countries joined the European Union, while NATO added seven new members. Out of these ten or seven countries, five countries (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia and Slovenia) became members of both the EU and NATO. Member states of one or the other organization increasingly seem to be contributing to international peacekeeping and peace-building missions, whether in the Balkans, Afghanistan, Iraq, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Southern Lebanon or Darfur, Sudan. In this sense, NATO and the EU are providing an ideal framework for multilateral peace-building and peace-keeping activities.
About fifteen years ago, former Foreign Minister of Luxembourg, Jacques Poos, declared with regard to crisis management in the Balkans, and in particular, with regard to war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, ‘the hour of Europe has come’. Reality however proved the Europeans wrong: without the help of America, the EU on its own was unable to end war. Nevertheless, there are indications that a common European foreign and security policy, including the use of force, has become more evident. In August 2006, EU member states agreed to support a UN peacekeeping force in Southern Lebanon. The EU is also responsible for EUFOR, the peacekeeping force in Kosovo, and has helped UN election monitoring in the Democratic Republic of Congo, among other missions. However, most of all the inability to agree on a common constitution, which foresaw the creation of a common foreign minister, has again shed doubts on EU ability to speak with one voice. In addition, peacekeeping missions that are ‘outside of Europe’ still “often have to be dressed up as humanitarian missions, and may even be dispatched in somebody else’s name” (European Union in the World, 2006, page 22).
How are transatlantic relations relevant to the topic of preventive diplomacy and post-conflict peace- and nation-building? They matter, given European interest in the second half of the 1990s in institutionalizing conflict prevention within the institutions of EU. While there were intentions to incorporate conflict prevention into the responsibilities of the Council of the European Union - one of the policy-making institutions in the EU - today conflict prevention is a strong focus of the EU Commission. To better coordinate aspects of the common European foreign and security policy, such as conflict prevention, cooperation between the High Representative of EU’s Foreign and Security Policy, on the one side, and the EU Commission on the other side, seems necessary to link successfully issues of conflict prevention with the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. This was one of the core issues, the so-called EU constitution addressed.[8] Also, given more or less robust peacekeeping missions within Europe, such as in the Balkans in the 1990s, the close coordination between allies, either within EU or NATO, proved essential. While the Kosovo Force (KFOR) and the former Stabilization Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina (SFOR) have been NATO missions, European or EU member states have assumed larger responsibility over the years, with the US role successively decreasing. Transatlantic relations also mattered, how non-EU, but NATO members, such as Turkey, were able to cooperate with non-NATO, but EU members, such as Sweden in post-conflict reconstruction and peacekeeping in the former Yugoslavia. We can therefore conclude that transatlantic relations are of relevance for how Europe and North America deal with humanitarian crises, such as intra-state conflicts or other global threats, such as terrorism or proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
So, is the West entering a ‘new age of preventive war’? In the words of Thomas Nichols, “the emergence of mass-scale suicide terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the loosing of rogue states from Cold War constraints are leading nations to embrace the temptations of preventive military action”. The official rhetoric in Washington and elsewhere was “couched in the more acceptable language of preemption”, but there could be “no mistaking the growing acceptance of preventive uses of force” (Nichols, 2005, page 1). A NATO report on ‘building peace and stability in crisis regions’ that was published in 2005 sees the greatest and most visible change in NATO’s activities since the end of the Cold War in “its involvement in ending conflict, restoring peace and building stability in crisis regions. Indeed, the Alliance is currently involved in a variety of capacities in complex, peace-support operations on three continents: in the former Yugoslavia in Europe; in Afghanistan and Iraq in Asia; and in Darfur, Sudan, in Africa”.[9]
On October 6, 2002, NATO declared, the alliance needed to be capable to take action whenever the security of its members was threatened, upon the basis of the United Nations Charter. By making it clear that there is no safe haven for those who would threaten our societies or for those who would harbor such people, the deterrent element of Alliance strategy was strengthened. The North Atlantic Council should decide actions on a case-by-case basis. Where NATO as a whole was not engaged, allies willing to take action should be able to make use of NATO assets, procedures and practices. The declaration stressed high priority goals essential to the full range of Alliance missions including the defense against terrorism (NATO Transformed, 2004, page 11).
This new initiative was to be based on firm national commitments with specific target dates. National commitments should be made transparent for parliamentary monitoring and oversight. Priority should be given to projects maximizing multi-nationality, and which had the potential to become common NATO assets. NATO and European Union capabilities initiatives needed to be mutually reinforced and thoroughly harmonized through permanent co-ordination mechanisms and procedures in a spirit of openness. NATO should redouble its efforts to reduce the fragmentation of defense procurement efforts through the pooling of military capabilities, co-operative acquisition of equipment and common funding. It should reduce to a minimum the obstacles for the sharing of technology. The alliance had to be able to act wherever NATO’s interests were threatened, creating coalitions under NATO’s own mandate, as well as contributing to mission-based coalitions, concerning both, old and new threats. Former NATO General Secretary, Lord Robertson referred to the experience NATO had with post-conflict stabilization, such as in Kosovo and Macedonia. On October 8, 2002 Robertson declared, an enormous number of security issues on the Euro-Atlantic agenda required the greatest possible communication and coordination among Europeans and North Americans. The November 2002 Prague Summit covered a wide range from terrorism, NATO’s military command arrangements and headquarters structure, to a further development of Partnership. The most visible issues referred to enlargement and improvements to NATO’s military capabilities. The question of capabilities concerned the member countries of NATO and of the European Union. Because each nation had only one set of forces, it was necessary to make the best use possible of scarce resources, avoiding duplication and overlaps. The message was clear: the European Capabilities Action Plan and NATO’s Prague Capabilities Commitment needed to be coherent. Work in full transparency on capabilities issues was imperative, if EU-NATO impasse was to be avoided or ended. Finally, NATO’s Response Force should provide “a high-tech, flexible, rapidly deployable, interoperable and sustainable force, including land, sea, and air elements, capable of carrying out the full range of Alliance missions. The development of this high-readiness force will also serve as a catalyst for promoting improvements and greater interoperability in Alliance military capabilities to ensure their continuing transformation to meet evolving security challenges”. This concerned crisis management that increasingly in regions that would have been outside the North-Atlantic area during the Cold War (NATO Transformed, 2004, page 10).
During a presentation at an annual conference of the Dutch Association of American Studies in Middelburg, the Netherlands, on June 6, 2003, the author of this paper discussed the likely impact of a US proposal for a NATO reaction force within the Euro-Atlantic arena. The US proposition to create a NATO reaction force, which was accepted at NATO’s November Summit in Prague, will probably have a lasting and weakening impact on EU rapid reaction forces. Germany – in all likelihood – has been one of the unhappier countries about the development in question. While Great Britain has perceived the European security and defense policy (ESDP) incorporated in NATO, Germany has regarded ESDP as soft-power alternative to NATO. France has been suspicious concerning US leadership in NATO and thus has hoped for ESDP to create hard-power alternatives to NATO.
What does this mean for today’s precarious situation in the wider Middle East? The author of this paper originally envisioned as potential compromise a multi-national peace force commonly-led by EU and NATO in Southern Lebanon. In that case, the corresponding proposal could ideally have come from Berlin. The argument was, that a common EU-NATO framework would entail the whole toolbox of peacemaking and peacekeeping measures. So-called softer and harder security policy instruments would be intertwined, and a wide range of contributing actors would be considered. As argued before, NATO acquired a thorough expertise in peacekeeping and peace-building in the 1990s. The experience in the Balkans had already been beneficial to NATO peacekeeping in Afghanistan, in Iraq, and in Sudan. Furthermore, during the Cold War, NATO always was more than just a military alliance. Last, but not least, the transformation declaration of NATO of October 2002 stated precisely that NATO would go global where the threat was – also based on UN resolutions. With regard to EU, it had in recent years widened the core components of its external relations – humanitarian aid, development and trade – by a common European foreign and security policy. The Stability Pact for the Balkans and the close cooperation of many actors engaged in post-conflict reconstruction and peace-building in Bosnia-Herzegovina or Kosovo could and might serve as examples for future peace- and nation-building efforts in the Near East. In summary, the activities of the EU-led stabilization force (EUFOR) in the Balkans and EU supporting UN peacekeepers in the Democratic Republic of Congo can exemplify the increasing potential of EU peacemaking.
Conclusions
What would have been the advantage of NATO being involved in post-war peacekeeping in the Near East? For one, it is doubtful that logistical capacities of the EU match those of NATO. ESDP still benefits from an agreement with NATO that EU can use NATO assets for EU peace missions. On the other hand, the following statement by President Jacques Chirac seems questionable, too: „For technical reasons but also political reasons, NATO is not designed for this [peacekeeping] intervention [in Southern Lebanon] (Sciolino & Cooper, 2006). And, while NATO might have been perceived as extension of US American interests, a EU-led peace mission in Southern Lebanon can be perceived as an extension of the foreign policy of former European colonial powers. In contrast, a peace mission that was based on a shared EU-NATO framework would have allowed for the contribution of nation-states that are a member in EU, but not in NATO and the other way around. The latter concerns foremost Turkey, which, as the sole Muslim country in the North-Atlantic-European arena can play a constructive role. Furthermore, members of the NATO ‚Partnership for Peace’ would be able to contribute as well. Therefore, it seemed that NATO and EU could make for an international force that is powerful, broad-based and capable to enforce UN resolution 1559. While Germany has had the potential to help bridge policy gaps between France and the United States, the latter two countries on August 5, 2006 managed to agree on a preliminary UN resolution to end all hostilities among Israel and Hezbollah. Though the Lebanese government rejected the compromise, the fact that the permanent members of the UN Security Council on both sides of the Atlantic were able to preserve their unity regarding a common vision for lasting peace in the Near East was significant. Partners within the transatlantic alliance had obviously kept in mind that division among themselves on the current crises and challenges in the Near East and Middle East, whether in Lebanon or vis-à-vis Iran, could only have been perceived as weakness of the Atlantic community or the West.
On August 12, 2006 then, the United Nations Security Council agreed on UN Resolution 1701, The resolution welcomed the efforts of the Lebanese prime minister and the commitment of the government of Lebanon to extend its authority over its territory, through its own legitimate armed forces. It also welcomed the government’s commitment to a UN force that is supplemented and enhanced in numbers, equipment, mandate and scope of operation, and bearing in mind its request in this plan for an immediate withdrawal of the Israeli forces from Southern Lebanon.
While the United Nations have planned to boost the limited existing UNIFIL force to 15,000 soldiers as foreseen in UN resolution 1701, the question has remained, which countries in the end would deliver how many troops? Early on, there was an apparent reluctance to pledge and contribute troops. The main challenge, however, facing the multinational peace force in support of UNIFIL and the Lebanese army, which will be spearheaded by EU, seems to lie in the disarmament of Hezbollah. Resolution 1701 gave the international force ‘strong potential power’ in that regard; the international force is supposed to ensure that its area of operations is not utilized for hostile activities of any kind, to resist attempts by forceful means to prevent if from discharging its duties. The implementation of these provisions - in the case that Hezbollah were not to withdraw, nor to disarm - would put the international force, UNIFIL, the European peacekeepers, and the Lebanese army in confrontation with Hezbollah. As a consequence, France initially insisted that Hezbollah disarm before the deployment of an international or multinational force. A number of critical questions became apparent. Why should Hezbollah disarm before the constitution of an international force? Will the Lebanese army enforce peace in Southern Lebanon, also by disarming Hezbollah? Will the international peacekeepers – led by European EU and NATO member states, France and Italy – be able and willing to prevent the rearmament of Hezbollah? With regard to Germany, will the German navy deployed to the Near East for the first time ever since World War II have to use force to search suspicious ships that might carry weapons to Hezbollah? Only one thing seems to be certain for now: In the case the Lebanese army and the international peacekeepers, led by France and Italy, will prove unable to disarm Hezbollah, the mandate provided by UN resolution 1701 to the multi-national force will have been ill-defined since in the end insufficiently robust.
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1 For information regarding Germany’s Chancellor Merkel, see www.bundeskanzlerin.de
2 The comments by Joachim Bitterlich stem from an interview with DIE WELT on February 18, 2003. See Frankreich, die Nummer eins, Der Ex-Berater von Kanzler Kohl sieht neue Hackordnung in Europa, DIE WELT, February 18, 2003, www.welt.de/data/2003/02/18/43015.html
3 The remarks are part of a conference paper on US-German Relations, presented at the annual conference of the Dutch Association of American Studies, Middelburg, The Netherlands, June 3, 2003.
4 See Historische Verantwortung. Ex-General Willmann für Lbianon-Einsatz der Bundeswehr, Süddeutsche Zeitung, August 5, 2006, page 1. Willmann’s comments can be translated as follows: It was difficult to imagine any other mission by the German Bundeswehr that was more useful and more in Germany’s national interest than a peace mission that contributed to the stabilization in the Near East.
5 Personal interview with representative of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Berlin, January 2001.
6 The comments in question were shared during the annual ‘Young Leaders Conference’, organized by the American Council on Germany, Berlin, August 27 – August 31, 2006.
7 The quote stems from the following article: Iran Widens Gap in Nuclear Intelligence, The New York Times, May 19, 2006.
8 For information regarding the EU constitution, see www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp
9 Building Peace and Stability in Crisis Regions, NATO Crisis Management Briefing, September 2005, www.nato.int/docu/briefing/crisis_management/html_en/crisis01.html, page 1.
