Erstellt am: 10.10.2003 Autor: Elizabeth G. Book Status: Bisher nicht definiert
U.S. Guidelines a Barrier to German-American Armaments Cooperation
As cooperation diminishes, transatlantic gap widens
Growing U.S. self-reliance and increasingly tough government guidelines for foreign nations has rendered 2003 a low point for transatlantic armaments exchanges. At its highest point, between 1997 and 1998, the U:S. spent 420 million in Germany while Germany spent 2.3 billion (2300 million) on American defense products. Experts speaking at a defense industry roundtable at the German Council on Foreign Relations in Berlin agreed that the U.S. and their American counterparts had much to do to renew and refresh a relationship that has been fraught with cynicism over the last year, most notably due to a semi-breakdown in diplomatic relations over the Iraq crisis.
Hilmar Linnenkamp, director-general of armaments and international relations for the German Ministry of Defense said that most German contracts approved by the U.S. Defense Department were won through competition within the Foreign Comparative Testing Program, which is perhaps a signal of hope in a bureaucracy that is making it increasingly difficult for foreign countries to compete in the U.S. armaments marketplace.
Before 2003, armaments cooperation has been strong between the two nations since 1978, when a memorandum of understanding was signed, encouraging a “two-way street,” or mutual flow of defense procurement products, Linnenkamp said. Development of joint launch rocket systems and NATO interoperability project followed, and good relations as well as robust spending characterized much of the 80s and 90s, he said. “Historically, the U.S. was the buyer and Germany was the seller,” he said.
Linnenkamp echoed critics of current U.S. defense policy in explaining why the last several years have been less successful. “The munitions list is too long, as is the process of export licensing,” he said. Linnenkamp also complained that the Buy American Act, passed as part of this year’s defense spending legislation, works against Germany because many products the U.S. previously purchased in Europe, such as material for military uniforms, must now be purchased from American firms. Linnenkamp also said the “Big Five,” American defense contractors (Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon, General Dynamics and Boeing), effectively dwarf the competition. Also, U.S. industry orders for dual-use items, such as German machine tools, are down, he added.
However, Linnenkamp said prospects may improve with April’s release of the U.S. Defense Department’s Transformation Planning Guide. “It includes a DOD plan for multi-national cooperation, it follows through with performance-based acquisition, and it explains the strategy of spiral development.” Linnenkamp said that spiral development is “a wonderful innovation.” Spiral development is a spending plan for acquisition of large defense systems, allocating a certain amount of money each year for products that require numerous years to be developed or delivered.
Also included in the planning guide is an explanation of the department’s shift from platform orientation to system integration, and a focus on joint and central planning.
Linnenkamp mentioned that Germany’s defense officials need to develop a policy to highlight changing world conditions and current pressures. Especially, the policy must address the threat of proliferation of critical technologies. The advantages of globalization must be balanced with the risks, he said, and added that he hoped Germany would soon work out a declaration of principles for armaments policy.
But it is not just the munitions list and export licensing policies that have widened the gap across the Atlantic. The growing disparity between Europe and America’s research and development budgets are making future prospects for transatlantic armaments cooperation look hopeless, said Manfred von Nordhein, senior advisor to the CEO of EADS North America. Last year, the U.S. spent 65 million on research and development (R&D), while all of Europe’s R&D spending combined only added up to 12 million. 12 million is only a little bit more the amount that the U.S. spent on missile defense research alone, which was approximately 9 million, said von Nordhein.
The low levels of R&D and procurement spending in Europe are working against cooperation, even though armaments cooperation is a stated goal on both European and American agendas, he said. “Budget pressures are forcing the Europeans to cooperate with each other closer than before, widening the transatlantic gap,” said von Nordhein. At the same time, strong budget growth in America’s defense planning combined with the broadening technology gap with Europe are reducing the U.S. imperative for cooperation, he said.
There are limits to what industry can do to promote cooperation, said von Nordhein, as “industry-to-industry efforts depend heavily on government rules and regulations.” “Prospects for U.S.-German armaments cooperation are bleak unless there is a distinct political will and commitment to pursue it,” he said.
