Erstellt am: 07.11.2005 Autor: Michaela Hertkorn Status: Senior
Security Challenges for the Transatlantic Alliance: an Initial Assessment after German Elections
The following presentation was held at the Annual Conference of Security Studies Sections of both, International Studies Association and American Political Science Association in Denver, Colorado on October 28, 2005.
German-US relations and French-US relations turned sour on the issue of Iraq in late 2002 and early 2003. Ever since then, much of the attention by scholars and observers of transatlantic security matters focused on prospects for a new chapter in both, German-US relations and transatlantic relations (see for example Elizabeth Pond: ‘Friendly Fire’ or Stephen Szabo’ s ‘Parting Ways’, among others). Given the enormous challenges, partners on both sides of the Atlantic face, more emphasis should be placed on what needs to be done and on actual transatlantic cooperation in security terms.
With all what has been going on globally, whether it is the war against global terrorism or threats to global health in the light of battling 'avian flu', or the need to provide immediate security and to engage in long-term reconstruction after both, man-made and natural disasters, we need to analyze these relationships constantly within their changing context! The post-conflict transition in Iraq is more than two years under way. We are one year after President Bush’ s re-election as President and four years into the global war against terror. With regard to Germany, we will be dealing with a changed government under the leadership of a new Chancellor, after former Chancellor Schroeder’s self-initiated ‘no-confidence-vote’ in the Lower House – the Bundestag – on July 1st 2005.
How big the change in foreign and security policy will be, under Angela Merkel, is still somewhat murky. She indicated during a visit to Paris in July 2005 that the special axis between Paris-Berlin-Moscow was going to be no more with her in the ‘Bundeskanzleramt’. In her words, although German-French relations were essential to so-called European integration, they should not be at the expense of other partners in Eastern and Western Europe. We could add at this point, that EU integration suffered a serious setback when the EU constitution was not ratified by every single EU member state after French and Dutch voters turned the draft treaty down.
When dealing with the transatlantic alliance, the main actors are the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and respective national governments. However, one also needs to consider the European Union (EU). Both organizations saw their members enlarged in 2004, and the so-called European security and defense policy (ESDP) has caused tensions within the transatlantic alliance because of its overall direction and the risk that Europe might ‘duplicate, decuple and discriminate’. Another point of tension has been, whether a common Europe under the leadership of France and Germany (and alternating others) has been set on a course to ‘counterbalance’ the US in matters of European and international security?
In September 2002, NATO Ambassadors in Poland discussed NATO enlargement and how to streamline capabilities. NATO’ s transformation declaration of October 2002, stated NATO would go global where the threat was – also based on UN resolutions. This meant NATO formally embraced ‘out of area missions’. The US proposition to create a NATO reaction force (NRF) for peacekeeping, which was accepted at NATO’ s November 2002 Summit in Prague, would have a lasting impact on the rapid reaction forces of the EU; with the rapid reaction forces being a theoretical, however marginally implemented, corner stone of the so-called common European security and defense policy.6
France and Germany were the two countries mostly displeased about the previously characterized developments. Why? The reasons have to do with how the common European security and defense policy was conceptualized in the first place by different EU member states, views that are remarkably different within Europe:
Britain perceives ESDP incorporated in NATO. Germany’s previous Social-Democrat-Green government regarded ESDP as soft-power alternative to NATO, probably after what must have been a traumatic experience for a formerly pacifistic party, when having had to support NATO' s military intervention in Kosovo in 1999 to 'prevent genocide’, as former German Foreign Minister, Joschka Fischer, put it. France finally has hoped for ESDP to create hard-power alternatives to NATO.
The French position is not new: When Paris proposed the creation of a European Defense Community (EDC) in the early 1950s, it was an attempt to avoid German rearmament in NATO. Paris was opting for a strong European defense pillar that was separate from NATO. When the EDC – a French proposal - was ironically defeated in the French Assembly in 1954, the US proceeded with re-arming Western-Germany. Western integration in Europe was thus intrinsically linked with strong transatlantic ties. In a remarkably similar way, French leadership in recent years heavily favored the EU constitution. That the draft treaty now was turned down by French citizens seems to make up for an ironic ‘deja-vu’.
Back to the difference with regard to ESDP: In April 2003, at a so-called ‘mini-summit’ of four EU and NATO member states - the so-called ‘praline countries’ - France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg discussed the creation of EU military structures that were fully separate from NATO. The project in all likelihood would have been underfinanced, given the absence of British participation. It comes as no surprise that the summit caused diplomatic turbulences within NATO.
Plans for EU military and defense capabilities – fully independent from NATO - suffered their various setbacks. In December 2003 at a meeting of NATO foreign and defense ministers, it was decided not to include a defense clause within the constitution of the EU and not to create an independent EU military headquarter. In addition, on December 13, 2003 the EU failed to agree on the constitutional draft mainly because of Spanish and Polish resistance. But also other smaller countries both in East and West had hesitations, such as the Netherlands, Denmark or the Czech Republic. Today, the constitution is arguably ‘dead’ and put on hold with it are for instance any plans for a common EU Foreign Minister.
With regard to intra-European relations in 2004: The dynamics changed after 3/11 or the terrorist attacks in Madrid on March 11, 2004. Before the attacks, main transatlantic dialogue occurred between Washington DC and certain European countries on a bi-lateral level, all around France and Germany – avoiding the two. Great Britain to the North, Italy to the South, Spain to the West and Poland to the East of Germany – those were the most important European allies to the US, in the aftermath of 9/11. When a new socialist government assumed power in Spain in Spring 2004, parameters for both transatlantic and intra-EU relations changed again.
In general, the attacks in Madrid added a sense of urgency in Europe: Terror concerned Europe, too – whether just as allies to the US, or not. The in-famous ‘Bin Laden’ tape that offered Europe a 'truce' and the murder of an Italian hostage in Iraq - all in March/April 2004 - seemed to have had the potential to unite’ Europeans, instead of pulling ‘US protagonists’ away from those countries that did not support the war in Iraq.
In the aftermath of 7/7, we may ask, what the long-term impact of terror attacks in London in July 2005 may be? Will Europe’ s governments share more intelligence? Will the EU take on a larger counter-terrorism role? Will the solidarity demonstrated between France and the UK during the G8 Summit in Scotland last? Will it move the US and all its allies closer together?8
By mid 2004, transatlantic and intra-EU relations could be characterized as follows: Germany seemed to realize that ‘being the junior partner of France’ instead of the ‘junior partner of the US’ actually hurt its own national interests. Former Chancellor Schroeder tried to convince Germany’ s 'smaller' EU neighbors that France and Germany were not intent on ‘dominating the European Union’, though French-German relations were still ‘a driving force for EU integration’. An article in the Economist of April 10, 2004 ‘Of Entente, understanding and Verstaendnis’ stated: “Meanwhile the French realize that, in a EU of 25, the Franco-German motor is not going to be enough to preserve their influence”.
We have to understand that the French no-vote on the constitution this year, not only hurt Chirac badly politically, but also the previous Schroeder government across the Rhine. Complete political European integration or a full federation had been on top of the German foreign policy agenda since 1998, next to obtaining a permanent seat within the United Nations Security Council (another hopeless diplomatic goal, we might add, especially after the self-inflicted worsening of Germany' s relations with its formerly best ally and partner, the United States of America in recent years). With the constitution, European citizens voted down the idea to further reduce national sovereignty on the European continent
2004 also saw NATO expansion and EU enlargement. Given the fact that ten countries joined the EU on May 1, 2004, and seven countries joined NATO on March 29, 2004, one could argue the EU and NATO have more and more in common. This means an increasing number of countries are members both in EU and NATO, their heads of state are meeting on a regular basis, and both organizations’ members contribute to international peace operation or post-conflict reconstruction.
The previous German government clearly did not cherish this view. During a security conference in Munich in early 2005, former Chancellor Schröder surprised NATO allies with a proposal to reform NATO.9 Germany’ s Defense Minister argued NATO as an organization had not adjusted well enough to a changed geo-political landscape and had outlived its purpose as the main organization facilitating transatlantic dialogue. There were other important players to be counted with - meaning the EU should assume NATO’ s decisive role.10 The remarks were not well received within the Alliance.11 NATO General Secretary, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer declared, NATO was well capable militarily and politically to meet all current challenges. NATO was the body where major transatlantic consultations took place. Javier Solana, the High Representative of the Common European Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) emphasized, NATO had not lost its relevance. The remarks by the German Chancellor came only a few days after the Spring 2005 visit by US Secretary of State, Condoleeza Rice, to Europe – a visit generally well perceived by in Europe.12 After her talks in Berlin, for example, Rice obtained a pledge from Germany’ s Chancellor to do more to help Iraq.13 The Chancellor highlighted the Iraqi need for democracy and stability and that Germany, which had begun training Iraqi police officers in the United Arab Emirates, was ready to help if the Iraqi government asked for it. Schröder’ s surprising NATO declaration also came after NATO had agreed to expand its Afghanistan mission during a February meeting in Nice.14
All NATO members by late 2004 agreed to either send troops to Baghdad, to train Iraqi officers outside the country, or to donate to a trust fund financing the mission.15 NATO members thus agreed on an official peace-keeping/nation-building role for NATO as an organization in Iraq.
Why the previous German Chancellor chose to make his surprising comments one week before the visit of President George W. Bush to Europe, in Spring 2005, remains somewhat unclear. In any case, and probably not surprisingly, during President Bush’ s visit to Europe, French President Jacques Chirac welcomed the so-called Schröder ‘plan’ to ‘out-balance’ NATO through EU and thus to ‘counter-balance’ US leadership in NATO.
The statement by the former German Chancellor may well have been aimed at a domestic audience, possibly to distract from growing economic problems.16
With regard to Germany’ s economic problems, the country has been facing an unprecedented level of unemployment: a level not seen since the end of World War II and resembling Weimar conditions.17
It seems, the German public realizes more and more how real and pressing the corresponding problems are. After new elections were invoked on July 1, 2005, we now have a different coalition government forming in Germany.
Interestingly, in January 2005, the previous Chancellor still made a case for national sovereignty, and this in the only area where the European Union arguably successfully managed to transfer sovereignty to the transnational level: the economy. Schröder “demanded that the EU’ s near-defunct stability and growth pact be relaxed. He added in a Financial Times article that ‘intervention by European institutions in the budgetary sovereignty of national parliaments [should be] permitted only under very limited conditions.’”18
While on the one hand suddenly supporting national sovereignty with regard to fiscal and budgetary policy, the former Chancellor tried to bypass a decision recently made by the German parliament, not to lift the sanctions and the arms embargo previously put on China. The former Chancellor tried to enable the European Commission to go ahead with the lifting of the embargo. This is a perfect example, how external relations on the European level as promoted by the EU Commission can conflict with national parliaments in Europe – without much public discourse or scrutiny.
The policy by the previous German Chancellor to support the lifting of the arms embargo must be seen in the light of strong, national economic interests and Germany’ s growing export dependency.19 The issue of lifting the EU weapons embargo against China was discussed during President Bush’ s Spring 2005 visit to Europe and promises to remain on top of the agenda with regard to future transatlantic disputes.20
It seems that growing economic tensions and rivalries between (some) European countries, such as Germany, and the United States might be at the center of future transatlantic problems.21
Growing export dependency by Germany from countries such as China is paralleled by an unprecedented energy dependency from Russia; two countries that have a decisive role to play in international relations and with regard to conflicts, such as North Korea, Iran or Syria.22 It has been troubling, to which extent the close relationship between former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and Russian President Vladimir Putin seems to have been based on national economic interests, while concerns about democratic reform in Russia seemed not to be the decisive factor in Berlin when dealing with Moscow.
So, where are we now?
Both, the recent change in government in Germany and the no-vote by French citizens on the EU constitution will have an undeniable impact on both, intra-European dynamics and on transatlantic relations.
I personally conclude that a so-called ‘two speed Europe’ with countries, such as France and Germany proceeding with the creation of a real political federation - arguably the vision of former German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer - or creating a ‘counter-balancing European superpower' - probably French President Jacques Chirac’ s policy - will not become a reality. The question now is: if ever closer integration or ‘deepening’ has suffered a serious setback, what will happen to further enlargement concerning countries such as Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey? If deepening is over, what will happen to widening? The EU Summit in Brussels of June 16 to 17, 2005 turned out as ‘battle ground’ of diverging views on the future direction of Europe, in political and economic terms. The two main antagonists Chirac and Blair argued over EU subsidies with Britain not giving in (this time), demanding that more of the EU budget be spent on research, instead on the CAP, the agricultural policy.23
On another 'front', the latest gas pipeline deal between Russian President Putin and former Chancellor Schroeder raised Polish-German misunderstandings and tensions to a new level. Polish newspapers in September 2005 spoke about the new Ribbentrop-Molotow pact: “Building the gas pipeline will help Moscow use gas as a means of a direct influence on the situation in the post-Soviet territory. In this way, Kreml has begun its geopolitical project of extending Russian influence on Europe. If we add to this the export of Russian oil to China, then we see a clear picture of the rising Russia…Polish membership in NATO and EU has increased its [strategic] role in Eastern Europe...” (Nowy Dziennik, Polish Daily News, September 17 - 18, 2005, www.dziennik.com).
We can assume that under the leadership of Angela Merkel, a new tone will be set with regard to many of Germany' s bi-lateral relations, whether this concerns Washington, DC, London or its neighbors to the East.24
How independent the new Chancellor will be when setting the guidelines for a new foreign policy agenda within a coalition of Christian and Social Democrats, remains however to be seen.25
After Germany’ s elections, President Putin promptly expressed his hope to “continue ‘positive’ links with Germany under Merkel”.26
With Poland forming a new center-right government, Poland in all likelihood will not lose its ‘independed-mindedness’ when it comes to being critical with regard to further EU political integration.27 Its next-door neighbor, Ukraine seems to be moving closer to Putin’ s Russia again, one year after its successful revolution. The conflict between Juschtschenko and Tymoschenko hampered internal market reforms and did not move Ukraine closer to both, NATO and EU.
While US Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld during a recent trip to Lithuania called for NATO membership for Ukraine, the West currently seems to be overwhelmed by other problems, such as natural disasters in the form of Hurricanes in the US and the earthquake in Pakistan and neighboring countries.
These disasters have been, putting continued logistical demand for immediate relief and longer-term reconstruction on its national governments plus on NATO as an alliance with NATO having been delivering disaster relief to Pakistan.
An article in the Financial Times of June 20, 2005 stated “European self-absorption is a problem for America: …just as Washington is pushing to transform the Cold War security alliance into a global partnership better suited to dealing with 21st-century challenges, Europe risks lapsing into a mypic self-absorption that could cripple its ambitions to become a strategic player alongside the US on the world stage”.
With regard to NATO and its elevated role in ‘out of area’ peacekeeping, in places such as Afghanistan and Iraq, President Bush’ s trip to Europe in Spring 2005 highlighted the fundamentally important alliance between Europe and the United States; no matter what differences may have existed between the United States and some of its old allies, like France and Germany in 2002, 2003 or 2004.
The American President thus made sure to visit both international organizations that have emerged as main actors with regard to the transatlantic and intra-European security dialogue, NATO and the EU. President Bush in effect emphasized the importance of a strong and united Europe and characterized NATO as the “most successful alliance in the history of the world”.30
Endnotes:
Wolfgang Schaeuble, ‘Entering a New Era of Transatlantic Cooperation’ (presentation given at American Council on Germany, March 3, 2005).
2 ‘Friedrich Merz, ‘The Crisis in Europe and Early Elections in Germany’ (presentation at American Council on Germany, July 7, 2005).
3 ‘Neue Akzente. Der Kommentar’, DIE WELT.de, July 20, 2005.
4 July 2005 witnessed the 750th anniversary of Kaliningrad. To commemorate the event, Russia’ s President chose to invite French President Chirac and Germany’ s Chancellor Schroeder, but ignored the heads of state and government of neighboring countries, Poland and Lithuania – a clear diplomatic snub for Poland, which is a close ally of the US (in Iraq, but also during Ukraine’ s democratic revolution). Putin also sent a signal that he was trying to intensify relations between Russia and the EU, namely between Russia and so-called ‘old Europe’ represented by France and Germany – while clearly not emphasizing the changed nature of an enlarged Europe, enlarged among others by Poland and Lithuania.
5 ‘After No Votes on Constitution, EU Budget is Next’, New York Times, July 2005; ‘Can Poland Keep the Club from Flying Apart? Washington Post, July 3, 20005.
6 A recent article in the German Daily ‘Die Welt’ notes Chirac’ s ‘act of solidarity’ when he clapped on Blair’ s shoulders after his press conference – notwithstanding basic differences on the direction of the EU, EU subsidies, fighting poverty, US leadership in global affairs, and last but not least, the French disappointment over London winning the Olympic bid on July 6, 2005.
7 ‘NATO irritiert über Schröders Vorstoß. Opposition in Deutschland befüerchtet neue transatlantische Spannungen’, DIE WELT, February 13, 2005, www.welt.de/data/2005/02/15/463741.html;
8 Ibid.; ‘Irritationen über Schröders NATO-Thesen. Münchner Sicherheitskonferenz’, WAMS.de, February 15, 2005, www.wams.de/data/2005/02/13/462935.html
9 ‘Stoiber: Kanzler schoß schlimmes diplomatisches Eigentor’, DIE WELT, February 15, 2005; ‚Unionspolitiker mahnen bessere Zusammenarbeit zur USA an. Merkel und Schäuble plädieren für einen Neuanfang’, WELT.de, January 21, 2005: In late January 2005, Germany’ s largest opposition party called for better cooperation with the US; Stephen Bierling, ‘Nur wer mitspielt, kann gewinnen’, DIE WELT, January 21, 2005: “Magnetschwebebahnen zu verkaufen, VW-Produktionsstätten zu eröffnen sind keine Antwort“: The author critically discusses Germany’ s position concerning China’ s threat to Taiwan and concerning strategic resources, such as oil. Simply to focus on the export of magnetic trains, to open up VW production sites or to lift weapons embargos was neither a sufficient foreign policy, nor acceptable”; ‘Germany Backs End to EU Ban or Arms to China; Hopes for Airbus Deal – Sources’, AFX.COM, December 3, 2004; ‘German Foreign Minister for Critical Dialogue with Russia’, Financial Times Information, October 4, 2004; ‘Die Grünen bemängeln Schröders UNO-Offensive’, DIE WELT, December 11, 2004: “Die EU sollte versuchen, einen gemeinsamen Sitz im Sicherheitsrat zu bekommen. Sollte dies nicht gelingen, und Deutschland im Rahmen der UN-Reform einen Sitz erhalten, sind wir für die generelle Abschaffung des Veto-Rechts.“ The support by Germany’ s Green party for a common permanent EU Security Council Seat may stem from the realization that Germany will not likely obtain the necessary support for its own permanent Security Council Seat – among the reasons, recent tensions with the US and the lack of support by other European countries, such as Italy: ‚German FM regrets Italy’ s Opposition to its UN Council Bid’, Agence France Presse, September 25, 2004; ‘Germany Pushes for Permanent UN Security Council Seat’, Agence France Presse, September 23, 2004; ‘Brazil, Germany Bullish on UN Security Council Seats’, Agence France Presse, November 18, 2004.
10 ‘America and Its Allies. Condi’ s Challenge’, Economist, February 15, 2005; ‘France and America. Condi’ s Charm Offensive’, Economist, February 12, 2005; ‘Remarks at the Institut d’ Etudes Politiques – Science Politique Paris’, Secretary Condoleezza Rice, Paris, France, February 8, 2005, www.state.gov/secretary.rm/2005/41973.htm; ‘Rice Seeks New Chapter in Europe’, BBC News, February 8, 2005; ‘After Thanking Britain and Wooing Germany, Rice Moves on to Poland’, The Associated Press, February 5, 2005; ‘Rice Warns Russia on Democracy’, BBC News, February 5, 2005.
11 ‘Rice Gets Pledge from Schröder to Do More to Help Iraq’, New York Times, February 5, 2005; ‘Neues Kapitel in Beziehung zu Deutschland’, tagesschau.de, February 5, 2005, www.tagesschau.de/aktuell/jeldungen/0,1185,OID4030968_REF3_NAV,00.html; ‚Schily kündigt weitere Hilfen für Irak-Aufbau an, tagesschau.de, February 5, 2005; ‚Die alten Zeiten kommen nie wieder’, tagesschau.de, February 5, 2005.
12 ‘NATO Expands Afghanistan Mission’, BBC News, February 10, 2005; ‘Alliance to Expand Afghanistan Mission’, NATO Update, February 9, 2005, www.nato.int; ‘Top US Team Presses NATO on Iraq’, BBC News, February 8, 2005: ‘When Mr. Rumsfeld meets his fellow defense ministers in Nice, he will try to persuade more doubtful NATO members to contributetroops to a mission in Iraq to train officers for the local armed forces. The training mission should number 300 personnel from NATO countries but there are fewer than 100 on the ground so far…’
13 Ibid.: ‘…But Paris is unlikely to play along. French officials say any financial commitment will be made on a bilateral basis. France’ s offer to help set up an Iraqi Gendarmerie, with a training site in Qatar, will similarly be outside NATO’ s auspices. The stickiest issue, however, is likely to be France’ s refusal to allow its senior officers assigned to NATO to participate in the Iraq mission…’; ‘Die Geschichte wird Berlin und Paris widerlegen’, WELT.de, February 19, 2005 (Interview with Richard Perle): “Sie irrten sich schon, als Reagan den Kalten Krieg überwand, und sie täuschen sich auch in Bush, meint der Amerikanische Vordenker Perle”; ‘Launige Worte von Old Rumsfeld’, WELT.de, February 13, 2005; ‘Rumsfeld Safe from German Inquiry’, BBC News, February 10, 2005; Remark: And after the Chancellor had told Rice that Germany would ‘accept a new command structure for peacekeeping and anti-terror operations in Afghanistan, under the condition that the two missions remained separate’. At the same time, backed by the Alliance’ s Secretary-General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, US Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, obviously pushed every NATO member to contribute to a NATO training mission in Iraq.
14 Craig Whitlock, ‘In Berlin Wall’ s Dust, Germany Flounders. Economy, Politics Seen Bleak 15 Years On’, Washington Post, November 9, 2004: “The most recent kick in the pants was Chancellor Gerhard Schröder’ s proposal last week to scrap German Unity Day as an official paid holiday to commemorate the reunification of East and West Germany in 1990. The purpose: to save money.” ‘Germany’ s Generation Gap. Where have all the Fighters Gone? Political Attacks on Joschka Fischer have been a Generation Thing, at least in part’, Economist, April 30, 2005; ‘Interne Dokumente widersprechen Fischers Aussage. In Tirana auch noch 2003 massive Problems mit erschlichenen Visa – Aussenminister versichert: Fehler waren abgestellt’, Die Welt.de, April 12, 2005; ‘Grosses Stühlerücken im Auswärtigen Amt’, Die Welt.de, April 12, 2005.
15 ‘German Growth Goes into Reverse’, BBC News, February 15, 2005; ‘Sluggish Economy Hits German Jobs’, BBC News, February 15, 2005; ‘Slowing Exports Hit German Growth’, BBC News, February 11, 2005; ‘Corporate Governance in Germany. A Model Out of Time?’ Economist, January 29, 2005; ‘Germany Seeks to Curb Far Right. The German Authorities Plan to Restrict Rallies by Far-Right Groups Intent on Undermining Official World War II Anniversary Events this Year’, BBC News, February 11, 2005; ‘Stoiber macht Schröder für Erstarken der NPD verantwortlich’, DIE WELT, February 5, 2005; ‘Germans Mark Bombing of Dresden’, BBC News, February 13, 2005; ‘German Visa Policy Sparks Furore’, BBC News, February 15, 2005: ‘German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer has accepted political responsibility for an immigration scandal that led to an influx of criminals into the EU’.
16 ‘Europe’ s Stability Pact. A Case for Nationalism’, Economist, January 22, 2005.
17 ‘EU-China: EU Trade Commissioner to Visit China, 23 – 26 February 2005’, Brussels, February 23, 2005, www.europa.eu.int/comm/trade: “…Europe is China’ s largest trade partner and China is Europe’ s second largest trade partner…”; Deutsch-Russische Milliardenprojekte Vereinbart’, WELT.de, April 11, 2005.
18 ‘Merci y’all (But Why the Heck Are You Selling Arms to China?’ Economist, February 26, 2005; ‘Chirac Defies Bush on China Arms’, BBC News, February 22, 2005: “US President George W. Bush has voiced ‘deep concern’ about European plans to lift an arms embargo on China – putting him at odds with the French president. Jacques Chirac said it was ‘no longer justified’ but Europe and the US should agree on conditions for lifting it. Earlier, Mr. Bush warned that arms transfers to Beijing would ‘change the balance’ of China-Taiwan relations’”. Richard Fisher, Jr., How May Europe Strengthen China’ s Military?’ January 15, 2005, www.strategycenter.net/printVersion/print_pub.asp?pubID=61; Robin Niblett, ‘The United States, The European Union, and Lifting the Arms Embargo on China’, EURO-FOCUS, Vol. 10, number 3, September 30, 2004; David Shambaugh, ‘China and Europe. The Emerging Axis’, Current History, September 2004;
19 Zbigniew Brzezinski, ‘The Geostrategic Triad’, CSIS Significant Issues Series, December 2001: “Global stability in the early twenty-first century will be conditioned largely how the United States handles its relations with China, Europe and Russia – the geo-strategic triad… Thus, the United States needs a well-defined strategy to manage to two ‘Eurasian power triangles’…”
20 Elisabeth Bumiller, ‘Bush Tells Putin Not to Interfere with Democracy in Former Soviet Republics’, New York Times, May 8, 2005; ‘Bush Denounces Soviet Domination’, BBC News, May 8, 2005: “President Bush has branded the former Soviet domination of Eastern Europe one of ‘the greatest wrongs of history’”; ‘President, Baltic State Presidents Discuss Strong Relationship’, May 7, 2005, www.whitehouse.gov/news
21 At the G8 summit in early July 2005, similar differences appeared between the UK on the one hand and France and Germany on the other hand, with Germany and France firmly opposing the phasing out of subsidized exports by 2010 – subsidies that limit free trade options for developing countries on the EU market, see: The Independent on Sunday, July 10, 2005.
22 Presentation by Prof. Reinhard Bettzuege at Center for European Studies, New York University, September 23, 2005: Prof. Bettzuege argued a new government under Merkel would try to move closer again to Washington, DC, to London and to its neighbors in Eastern and Central Europe, especially Poland. Relations with Moscow would be re-evaluated.
23 ‘Schroeder Aide Tapped as Foreign Minister’, Associated Press Online, October 13, 2005.
24 ‚Putin Hopes to Continue Positive Links with Germany under Merkel’, Agence France Presse, October 13, 2005.
25 ‘Polens kuenftiger Praesident will mehr Macht’, Die Welt, October 27, 2005.
26 William Drozdiak, ‘European Self-Absorption is a Problem for America’, Financial Times, June 20, 2005: “In Turkey, where EU accession negotiations are supposed to start this October, the dashing of membership aspirations could damage both European and US interests – not least in Iraq, where elements of Turkey’ s military command, want to halt momentum for Kurdish independence in the north. In Ukraine, Viktor Yushchenko, the president, faces critical elections next March and will require European support to sustain his fragile democratic revolution… For the US, any turn inward by Europe would reinforce the influence of neoconservatives and others who disparage European contributions and argue that the US should seize its ‘superpower moment in history’ to block challenges to its hegemony…”
27 ‘The President’ s Trip to Europe’, February 21, 2005, www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/europe/2005/index.html; ‘Analysis: Transatlantic Tensions Remain’, BBC News, February 22, 2002;
28 ‘President and Secretary General Hoop Scheffer Discuss NATO Meeting’, NATO Heardquarters, Brussels, February 22, 2005, www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/02/print/20050222-3.html; ‘President Meets with EU Leaders’, Brussels, Belgium, February 22, 2005, www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/02/20050222/8.html; ‘NATO Leaders Pledge to Help Iraq’, BBC News, February 22, 2005; ‘NATO Leaders Express Unity on Iraq, Reaffirm Values’, NATO Update, February 22, 2005, www.nato.int/docu/update/2005/02-february/e0222a.htm
