Erstellt am: 22.01.2005 Autor: Joshua Stern Status: Bisher nicht definiert
NATO Collective Security or Defense: The Future of NATO in Light of Expansion and 9/11
Introduction
During the Cold War NATO was the premiere security alliance in the West, yet over the last fourteen years there has been a great deal of debate about what exactly NATO’s role should be in a post-Cold War world. Originally NATO was created for one purpose “to keep the Americans in, Germans down, and Russians out”. The alliance functioned as a collective defense organiza-tion, set up to defend Europe from the threat of a Soviet invasion, and maintain the transatlantic link between the United States and Europe created during World War II. The alliance was suc-cessful, however when the mission was completed and the threat of a Soviet invasion disap-peared, there were fears NATO as a collective defense alliance would become obsolete.
These fears translated into questions about what NATO’s role should be in the post-Cold War world. One solution was to transform NATO to meet the security challenges of this new world. This solution sought to use the strengths NATO had built over the years (small collective group of allies, strong military capability, and ability to act with teeth) to confront the instability that resulted from the collapse of communism. This solution drew a great deal of criticism from scholars and government officials who worried such a role would change NATO from a collec-tive defense alliance to a collective security alliance and lead to its demise. They feared the end of the Cold War would enhance tension in the alliance and undermine its effectiveness. Moreover, if NATO were to take on such contentious issues as expansion and peacekeeping these tensions would only increase and lead to disintegration.
Despite this debate, very early on it became apparent NATO was going to refocus its mis-sion and deal with the security threats of a post Cold War world. In 1991 at a summit in Rome NATO released the New Strategic Concept.
“Risks to Allied security are less likely to result from calculate aggression against the territory of the Allies, but rather from the adverse consequences of instabilities that may arise from the serious economic, social, and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries, and territory disputes, which are faced by many countries in Central and Eastern Europe… This could, however, lead to crises inimical to European security and even to armed conflicts, which could involve outside powers or spill over into NATO countries, and have a direct affect on the security of the Alliance”.
NATO officials feared greater damage could be done to its allies and their security if NATO did nothing to confront instability on its periphery. This declaration in Rome began the slow process of a fundamental change in the alliance. The alliance was no longer a collective de-fense alliance, but an alliance focused on world security, under the assumption insecurity and de-stabilization in the world (especially on its periphery) could translate to insecurity to its members.
However, the 21st century has once again raised new questions and debates about NATO’s future. The attacks on September 11, 2001 have changed the focus of security threats in the world. Since 9/11, NATO has invoked article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, expanded and added seven new members, and is currently in charge of peacekeeping in Afghanistan. Despite these positives, or at least perceived positives for the alliance, the issue of Iraq has divided the al-liance, and the initial euphoria behind the US, “We are all Americans” , has turned to a serious division in the transatlantic alliance. What then does the future hold for NATO?
The purpose of this paper is to examine NATO’s future, but the focus will not be solely on NATO’s survival. Instead, the paper concentrates on what the exact role of the NATO alliance is, and the effect this could have on its relevance in the future. The main question the paper ex-amines is how feasibly is it to think NATO can face the security challenges of the 21st century as a collective security organization, in light of enlargement and the effects of 9/11? The answer to this question lies in an examination of enlargement and 9/11 and the effects they have on NATO as a collective security alliance. Enlargement creates some difficult obstacles for NATO as a col-lective security alliance. As the alliance enlarges it becomes harder for NATO to act in unison, divides the world into countries in NATO and outside of NATO, and lets in countries which might have different ideas about what NATO’s goals and interests are. These are serious prob-lems because they limit NATO’s ability to act, increase division inside and outside the alliance, and limit its legitimacy to act in ‘outside areas’.
The effects of 9/11 also raise serious questions about NATO’s future. Recently a great deal has been written about the different effects 9/11 has had on the US and Europe, or at least in enhancing or highlighting the different way the US and Europe view the world. It is argued the US uses multilateral institutions to secure its interests, but will act unilaterally when it believes its interests are in danger. Opposed to this view is the ‘European’ outlook that believes interests are better served through international law and multilateral negotiations. If one is to accept this fun-damental difference between the US and Europe , NATO appears to be in a precarious position. Based on these concepts the US’ view of NATO after 9/11 is to use it as a “tool box”, or a rally-ing place to build “coalitions of the willing” . And NATO finds itself transformed from
“a community sharing identity and norms in which an alliance for common defense was grounded, NATO is increasingly devolving into ad hoc coalitions. Ideally, such coalitions join the willing with the able. Nonetheless, they can easily and dangerously comprise either the willing but incapable or unwilling but capable… NATO’s political capacities to legitimate otherwise largely unilateral action by the United States are now far more important than any military contributions likely from other members”.
Using NATO in such a way does not really fit its collective security or collective defense identity, and raises some serious doubts about what kind of alliance NATO will be in the future.
To answer this question this paper will first focus on the conceptual ideas of collective de-fense and collective security and their role within NATO. Second, the paper will examine the is-sue of NATO expansion, and where will it end. The third part of the paper will deal with 9/11 and its effects on NATO as a collective security alliance. All these sections will try to explore NATO as a collective security alliance, and whether expansion and 9/11 will fundamentally change the alliance in such a way to make it irrelevant in the future.
Collective Security
The concept of collective security can be a tricky one. It is a term with many meanings in interna-tional relations, and is often connected to the liberal philosophy of international relations. The basic IR definition of collective security is “a system of world order in which the weight of the entire international community would be thrown against any state committing aggression, as pro-vided for in the UN Charter”. However, NATO’s transformation after the Cold War does not seem to fit this basic definition. A better definition of collective security that relates more to NATO transformation is explained by David Yost in his book NATO Transformed.
“ the Allies to date have wisely resisted calls to move toward a Kantian or Wilsonian system of collective security (Liberal). Such a system would imply obligations to deal with all cases of international aggression and injustice in the Euro-Atlantic region. In practice, despite their rather sweeping “security is indivisible” rhetoric, the Allies have pursued only collective se-curity of the major-power-consensus type, offering to act in support of collective security under the auspices of the UN Security Council and the OSCE”.
According to Yost, it would seem NATO has adopted a collective security framework based on the concept of collective defense. This relates back to the strategic concept and the idea NATO must face outside instability, because in the long term this can threaten NATO members’ security.
Even with this said there is a fundamental difference between a collective security organiza-tion and a collective defense organization. The two differ because they have different philoso-phies underlying their use. Collective defense is often affiliated with realism and collective secu-rity with liberalism. The realist perspective has a Hobbesian view of the world. It is a world where anarchy rules in international relations, a world without binding international rules, and where governments’ main concern is their own self-interest. Since governments’ highest concern is self interest, international relations is about power or getting countries to do what you want. Accord-ing to the realist paradigm, the world is a zero-sum game, where if one country gains another country has to lose. Under these conditions a collective defense organizations is more effective than a collective security organizations because it asks members to “identify with a specific threat common to them and can agree to mount mutual defense efforts against that threat”. Meaning multilateral security alliances will work only if states believe being active in one will help or pro-tect their interest. On the other hand, the doctrine of collective security is very different. Collec-tive security is based on the idealist or liberal perspective of international relations. The concept of collective security is usually tied to Woodrow Wilson and Immanuel Kant. “Renouncing power politics, Wilson rejected the contention that states inevitably function in a self-help system in which they necessarily place their own interests above the concern. He assumed that because states have ‘clear’ interests in protecting international order that they see as beneficial to their individual security, they will contribute to the coalition even if they have no vital interest at stake in the actual aggression”.
Liberalism believes in international law, and that countries will uphold this law because in the long run it is in their self-interest. The point of this paper is not if either one of these phi-losophies is right or wrong. What is important is the strategic change NATO made in its role af-ter the Cold War. In countless documents and summits after the Cold War, NATO stated the need to engage in the security issues outside of its members, to protect its members in a post Cold War world.
NATO’s action in the 1990 has fit the liberal collective security definition, but tends to have the realist outcome. In Bosnia, NATO was indecisive for a long period of time, due to a lack of resolve and a feeling the conflict was not in their direct interest. When NATO finally forcefully became involved it was out of fear if the alliance did not act it would be viewed as a failure. In Kosovo, NATO acted more forcefully but still ran into problems. The alliance was very uncertain on whether it would use ground troops if the air campaign was unsuccessful, and its ability to conduct the air campaign was hampered by having nineteen members.
The important point here is in the 1990’s when NATO was not acting in the direct inter-est of its members or there was no direct or clear threat, these short comings were overlooked, or seen as a small price to pay for NATO action, success, and legitimacy. But after 9/11, the role of NATO and the threat to the world has changed. Suddenly the US was directly attacked, and be-lieved there was now a real threat to its self interest. Under this condition, some believe (includ-ing the US) the collective security doctrine can hamper a country from acting against such a threat. A good example is the recent events in Afghanistan, when the US did not ask for NATO assistance, even though NATO invoked Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Making it appar-ent, when it came to a real imminent threat the US has no need for NATO, because of its collec-tive security nature.
NATO Expansion
From its conception, NATO has always left the door to expansion open. Article 10 in the North Atlantic treaty states “The parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European state in a position to further the principals of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty”. Nevertheless, after the Cold War expansion became a major issue in the debate over NATO transformation. Those in favor wanted NATO to encom-pass the old members of the Soviet block in Europe as a way to stabilize NATO’s borders, help these ex-communist countries make the transition to stable democratic market economies, and increase NATO’s legitimacy in the region. As for the potential members, joining NATO became a way to guarantee their independence for the foreseeable future against any kind of reemerging Russian power, and became a signal of a country’s acceptance into the Western World. On the other hand, detractors believed many of these countries were not ready to join the alliance, and instead of stabilizing the region, would only frightened the Russians who might view expansion as encirclement . Moreover, new members meant it would be harder for NATO to act as a col-lective security alliance, because the new members would add very little capability to the alliance and only threaten to broaden the alliance’s interests and security problems.
For most of the 1990’s NATO hesitated to move in either direction. If NATO expanded too fast it could cause reform to wane in former communist countries, and create feelings of mis-trust with Russia. But if NATO moved to slow it risked creating the image it was not ready to ac-cept these countries into the West. In response, NATO established the Partnership for Peace Program. The program allowed all former communist states to join and take part in alliance meetings and missions, hoping this would placate the fears that NATO would not forget about the ex-communist countries, and ease tension with Russia . NATO’s solution was to release a study in September of 1995 laying out the reasons and criteria for NATO expansion. A few of these criteria were:
- Encouraging and supporting democratic reforms, including civilian and democ-ratic control over the military;
- Promoting good-neighborly relations, which would benefit all countries in Euro-Atlantic area, both members and non-members of NATO;
- Reinforcing the tendency towards integration and cooperation in Europe based on shared democratic values and thereby curbing the countervailing tendency to-ward disintegration along ethnic and territorial lines;
- Strengthening the alliance’s ability to contribute to European and international se-curity, including participation in peacekeeping activities under the responsibility of the OSCE and peacekeeping operations under the authority of the UN Security Council as well as there new missions.
The study was a way to reassure Russia that expansion was in every countries’ interest, whether they were in NATO or not. The study also solidified the change in the alliance’s character from collective defense posture of the Cold War to collective security and the enhancing of security to the whole European region.
In July of 1997 in Madrid, NATO finally agreed to expand its membership to the post-communist states, and agreed to accept Poland, Czech Republic, and Hungary as new members. In April of 1999, at NATO’s 50th Anniversary celebration in Washington, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic were formally made members, and NATO approved the Membership Action Plan, which stated “No European democratic country whose admission would fulfill the objec-tives of the Treaty will be excluded from consideration, regardless of its geographic location, each being considered on its merit. All states have the inherit right to choose the means to ensure their own security”. NATO’s Action Plan in 1999 made it clear NATO had chosen full integration with post-communist Europe, and believed it was the inherent right for countries who met the criteria to join.
However, NATO expansion has not meant an end to the debate over its effect on the alli-ance’s future as a collective security alliance. First, NATO has to overcome its past, present, and future relationship with Russia. Russia still views NATO through the lens of the Cold War. NATO expansion remains relatively unpopular in Russian political circles and among its popula-tion. An example is the reaction by Russian officials in 2002 over the idea NATO could expand into the Baltic Republics. Russia’s foreign ministry spokesman Alexander Yakovenko suggested “that further eastward enlargement was a ‘mistake’, asking from whom is NATO preparing to de-fend its new members? And why is such a defense needed if we are no longer enemies and the period of confrontation is over? While Defense Minister Sergi Ivanov commented that Russia would be “forced to review not only its own military positions but also the entire spectrum of in-ternational relations should the Baltic States join the alliance.” Despite these reservations about expansion, Russia accepted NATO expansion in the Baltic States. Yet, this only heightened the feelings of mistrust, as violence in Chechnya continues and the other former Soviet republics re-main unstable, Russia will continue to feel threatened and try to block NATO interference in these conflicts.
NATO’s solution to this problem was the formation of the NATO Joint Council with Russia. The joint council has had some success in creating a dialogue between NATO and Russia, but it is limited. The Council only allows Russia to take part in NATO decisions, not vote on them, and the Joint Council did little to stop the disagreement over NATO’s action in Kosovo, and Russia’s walking out in protest. It would seem the only way NATO could reduce this tension is through letting Russia join the alliance as a full member. Having Russia as a member would al-low a durable peace to be established in Europe, prevent the emergence of a grey zone of former communist countries not in NATO, and would give NATO more influence in development in the East. The two problems with this suggestion are Russia is not interested in membership, and if Russia did join its membership would fundamentally change the character of the alliance. The first objection is due to Russia’s view the alliance is an anti-Russian organization, because of its past. The second objection relates to the different values that exist at this current time between Russia and NATO. If Russia were a member the alliance would need Russia’s approval to act, and as the Kosovo case has shown, Russia and NATO do not always have the same interests or values about how questions of security in Europe should be dealt with. On the other hand, not having Russia hurts NATO’s credibility and legitimacy to act as a collective security organization in the world, especially in areas Russia considers to be its sphere of influence. Putting NATO in a difficult position if it wants to continue to expand and deal with security threats on its periph-ery.
NATO enlargement also carries with it ramifications for NATO itself. As NATO adds more members its decision making process will become more and more cumbersome. This has already become evident as NATO has taken on ever more tasks that include the ‘deployment of crisis response operations’ that call for the use of force. The best example of the problem of de-cision-making for NATO was during the Kosovo military campaign. In Kosovo, during the air war the allies often argued over what targets to hit, intelligence leaked, capabilities were different and disagreement stopped action from taking place at stages of the conflict. All examples of how a nineteen member alliance can be slowed down by having too many members. A problem that can only intensify as NATO expands more.
Expansion can also have a divisive effect on the countries and areas it means to unite. A major question surrounding NATO expansion is where will the alliance stop. To this point the al-liance has not made any real distinction about any countries that could never join the alliance, meaning all countries are eligible once they meet certain political and economic criteria. NATO, as a collective security alliance, wants to be inclusive enough, so as to maintain legitimacy as a se-curity organization, yet exclusive enough so it is able to act, and not turn into the UN or the OSCE. A balance between the two sides is very difficult, and even the current situation appears that it might cause divisions in the region.
Both EU and NATO expansion has led many scholars and pundits to speak of a new cur-tain forming in the region . The point being, there is one side made up of current NATO or soon to be NATO and EU members, and on the other side countries like Ukraine, Belarus, Rus-sia, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and other post-communist states. In some cases these coun-tries face the problem of being so far behind the other post-communist countries in economic and political reform, or in strategic importance, membership is a long time away, if it happens at all. A division like this can breed jealousy, hatred, reverse reform (or in some cases never allow reform to take place), and cause these areas to look elsewhere, most likely to Russia, as it seeks to reclaim its past influence. If a division of this sort materializes it becomes even harder for NATO to act as a collective security organization, and could lead to NATO to be seen as a rival organi-zation, rather than a security organization focused on peace and security in Europe.
The other dilemma with expansion is where the alliance will stop. NATO after the last two rounds of expansion borders Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, the Balkans, and the Caucuses. All of these areas are unstable, and represent security risks and instability now and in the future. After this current round of expansion, NATO now has new unstable areas on its borders. If NATO applies the same thinking as it did during the 1990’s the solution would seem to be to expand and add these areas as new members, to provide carrots for these countries to reform. Highlighting a fundamental problem, if it continues to expand it will eventually have to be an organization like the UN, and have to worry about security threats everywhere in the world.
What all these points raise is not that the alliance faces disaster, or that the alliance is doing nothing to stop these problems. The dilemma is what kind of alliance is NATO. If it a collective security alliance focused on security threats, expansion limits NATO’s ability to face these chal-lenges. The bigger NATO gets, the bigger and more diverse its members’ views on security and self interest will be. In the case of security the new members all want to join the NATO from the Cold War. These countries want NATO the collective defense organization, the alliance that will guarantee their independence from Moscow for the foreseeable future, and integrate them into the West. While these new members support the Collective Security NATO, they support its ac-tions because they want to be a part of the old collective defense NATO. It will be interesting in the future to see if they continue to support NATO actions in ‘out of area’ operations when their troops and personal are in danger over issues not related to their direct self-interest.
If members begin to hesitate to support action they can affect the very qualities that make NATO work. NATO is an effective multilateral military alliance because it is a political security community of countries with common values and democratic institutions, “NATO works only because it is both military and political in nature. Dilute NATO’s political coherence and the re-sult will be a one-dimensional traditional military alliance that cannot operate effectively”. As the alliance becomes involved in areas without strategic value, its members begin to waver, and its effectiveness is damaged. A problem that has hampered many collective security organizations in the past, as actors become unwilling or lower their resolve when their self-interest is not in-volved.
9/11
“September 11 has brought home what a number of strategists have been predicting for years- that the new century would usher in new, different, and potentially very dangerous threats to our society… we are faced with new scourges- terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, mass migra-tions, rouge and failed states... 9/11 has become a symbol and metaphor for the new perils looming on the horizon.”
There is no doubt the events of 9/11 have forever changed the world security environ-ment. After 9/11, and the emergence of new and dangerous threats to society, many officials, pundits, and scholars called on NATO once again to redefine itself to face these new challenges. NATO solidified this new mission at the Prague Summit in October of 2002 where according to Lord Robertson it
“reached agreement on the character of the new threats and on the best way that NATO and its members should respond to them. Terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are the two defining challenges of the 21st century…As a result, in 2002, we ef-fectively buried the perennial debate on whether NATO could or should go “out of area”. At the Prague summit, we took that consensus a decisive step further. We agreed a new mili-tary concept for defense against terrorism, which states that our focus must be able to “de-ter, disrupt and defend” against terrorism, and that they should do so wherever our interests demanded it”.
NATO has seemingly tied its future to fighting the threat of terrorism; anywhere it takes the alli-ance. The focus on ‘deter, disrupt, and defend’, implies a much more offensive NATO that will act anywhere to meet these new security threats.
9/11 seemingly provided NATO with a new common enemy the alliance could rally its members around, yet in recent months, the alliance has appeared quite divided. The split began when the US declined NATO assistance in Afghanistan, and came to the surface over the issue of Iraq. This division surfaced because of the nature of the threat. Terrorism is a vague concept that has many different interpretations. As the alliance refocuses it mission to fight terrorism it has found its members have different ideas about the danger of terrorism and how to fight it. These different perceptions of terrorism represent a fundamental distinction between the way NATO members view the world and how they react to danger in the world.
There has been a great deal written recently about the differences in the way Europe and the US view the world. One of the more popular explanations is from Robert Kagan and his fa-mous phrase ‘the US is from Mars and Europe is from Venus’. Kagan argues “On the all important question of power-… American and European perspectives are di-verging. Europe is turning away from power, or to put it a little differently, it is moving be-yond power into a self-contained world of laws and rules transnational negotiation and co-operation. It is entering a post-historical paradise of peace and relative prosperity, the realiza-tion of Kant’s Perpetual peace”. The US, meanwhile, remains mired in history, exercising power in the anarchic Hobbesian world where international laws and rules are unreliable and where true security and the defense and promotion of a liberal order still depend on the pos-session and use of military might. That is why on major strategic and international questions today, Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus.”
The reason usually given for this difference is US military power begets an ideological tendency to use it. In Europe, by contrast, weak militaries coexist with an aversion to war, which were in-fluenced by social democrats ideas, the legacy of two world wars, and the experience of con-structing the EU.
While Kagan’s point can be a little overstated; recent events like declining the use of NATO in Afghanistan and US’ invasion of Iraq without UN or NATO support seem to show there is some truth to it. The US’ view that unilateral action is necessary to protect its own inter-ests, compared to a European focus on multilateral methods as the best way to serve its interests demonstrates one example of how members in NATO can clash over how to deal with threats.
Another distinction between NATO members in their outlook is related to how the allies view the terrorist threat. The perception of terrorism and the threat it poses on world security is perceived differently depending on what side of the Atlantic one finds themselves. The terrorist attacks on 9/11 have led many Americans to view the war against terrorism as a matter of vital interest. But since the attacks were not directed at them, Europeans find the threat less pressing, and tend to view the fall of the Berlin Wall as the defining security moment in recent history . While this might be a slight generalization, there is no doubt a different perception exists between how serious the threat is. In the case of the US, terrorism is dangerous and real, and the war on terror is understood as a life or death struggle for survival. While in the European 9/11 was not a perceived as a direct threat against their security, and Europeans have reacted with less fervor. These different perceptions of the threat also play a role in why the US wants to act more unilat-erally, given that it feels its security is very much under threat and will use any means to protect it. Whereas, the Europeans are more willing to work within a multilateral framework because their security or their perception of security is not in immanent danger.
The dilemma for NATO becomes how to deal with these differences in light of 9/11. The major problem for NATO becomes different members view the alliance differently. The US be-lieves acting through NATO (as multilateral organization) restrains its ability to act. The US’ ac-tions and comments over the past two years seem to support this . Whether it is comments like “issues should determine the coalitions, not vice versa” from Secretary of Defense Rumsfield, or statements by Condoleezza Rice like “US foreign policy should firmly be grounded in national interests, not in the interests of an illusory international community”. The US does not want its interests to be constrained by alliances or coalitions. Instead, the US wants to use NATO as a ‘toolbox’ , or a place where the US can pick up allies who have specific capabilities needed for a certain missions or have the capability to act alongside American troops to form ‘coalitions of the willing’. By acting around NATO, the US gets the benefits of NATO, having allies and legiti-macy, without the drawbacks of a collective security alliance.
Such a view of NATO is very dangerous for the alliance. For one it could cause division in the alliance, as the members who join the coalition might cause a spilt with those countries, for whatever reason, choose not to join the coalition. A dispute like this can breed tension between the members and lead to future conflicts about alliance action. A recent example is the rift that appeared between ‘Old’ and ‘New’ Europe over Iraq. New Europe supported the US campaign in Iraq, and immediately drew criticism from Old World countries like France. This tension manifested itself in other areas of the alliance, and reared it head in deliberations over providing defensive weapons to Turkey if it were attacked during the recent Iraq war. France held up the request and NATO was powerless to act for a day. While this event was solved the next day, it raises some serious doubts about the cohesiveness of the alliance if it is divided over the US pol-icy on fighting terror.
Not only can coalitions of the willing or the use of NATO as a ‘toolbox’ lead to division in-side the alliance, but it can also lead to its demise. If members feel left out of the alliance or feel they are being rendered powerless by US unilateral action they might look for new ways or or-ganizations to deal with international security and project power. In the news recently, there have been many stories about the division between the US and European countries over EU forces and their separation from NATO. Even though the controversy has died down, the threat of a separate EU force was a popular idea in light of US unilateral action. This hurts NATO because Europe can only afford one military capability, and if NATO members were to support a sepa-rate EU force this could be a deadly blow to NATO and its ability to act.
All these problems relate back to the diversity in the alliance and the different interests of its members. The US, West Europe, and East Europe all have different security interests and see NATO as a means to fulfill these interests. In the case of Eastern Europe NATO is the collective defense organization that will protect their independence achieved after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Western Europe wants an alliance to deal with security issues and peacekeeping operations as a kind of UN with teeth, but wants it done with other members having a say. The US wants the alliance to fight terrorism, but wants to use it to fit its unilateral tendency; basically to get the benefits of NATO, with none of the multilateral drawbacks. Can NATO then, continue to be an effective and feasible alliance with these different interests?
The answer is no. If it maintains its collective security nature the alliance is headed for dan-ger. Not a kind of danger where the alliance might disappear or the world will split, but a danger the alliance will not be the cornerstone of security in the 21st century. The reason is NATO is not fit to fight a war on terrorism the way the US wants to fight it. During the Cold War, NATO held together because its focus was on stopping an invasion. The alliance had its problems, but their shared danger was strong enough to keep the alliance together. In fact, it did such a good job countries still want to join it based on this past performance. It succeeded in the 1990’s because the threats that existed were not immanent. It was easier to face non-immanent threats through NATO because it provided an already used and successful framework for collective action. Moreover, against lesser threats multilateral drawbacks are acceptable because they allow coun-tries to act in conflicts they usually would not if they were alone because the cost of action may outweigh their interest in the conflict.
On the other hand, 9/11 changed every thing. Suddenly when security threats became real NATO was no longer desired in the same way, unless it submitted to US’ interests. Since the danger of terrorism and what it means differs among parties, the likelihood NATO as a whole would submit to fight terrorism the way the US wants was unlikely. What if during the Cold War, the US decided to launch a preemptive strike against the USSR. It is very likely Western Europe’s reaction would be comparable to the reaction about the war in Iraq. As history has shown when members in a collective security alliance have different threats and interests it is harder for them to work together. In the case of NATO, this fits because expansion and 9/11 add a variety of new members who have different views on security issues.
These differences cannot work in an organization that acts with all its members, loses le-gitimacy when members break off and act without other members, or form other organizations to deal with these problems. Even though NATO is not the UN (in matter of size and scope of world issues), a division in the alliance makes it much harder for it to act or be effective, losing its appeal for a collective security organization, and possibly giving it no appeal at all.
Conclusion
NATO also expanded the alliance after 9/11 with the backing of the US, not to make the alliance stronger in capability, but in the hope to gain more allies for the war on terror. This could all mean trouble for NATO if it continues to be a collective security organization. As long as there are major threats to the world and countries direct self-interest are at stake, countries will not want to work through an alliance all of the time. An examination of the last two years seems to point, in the case of the US, it only uses NATO when it feels it needs NATO. By acting this way towards NATO, can the alliance survive, will countries lose respect for the alliance and not want to work through it, if it continues to expand and be used as a ‘tool box’. The answer is probably no to both. Raising the notion it might not be possible for the alliance to be a collective security organization in the current climate, because of the way the terrorist threat is perceived. Meaning as long as NATO expands and 9/11 is a factor in security it cannot feasible act as a collective se-curity organization in the way the concept is currently defined, or thought as, which raise serious issues about NATO’s relevance in the long run as a security institution. Endnotes: 1. Yost, David, NATO Transformed (Washington, D.C.: USIP, 1998), p. 270. 2. Kupchan, Charles, Atlantic Security: Contending Visions (New York, NY: Council of Foreign Relations, 1998): The solution was to lower “expectations… (so) the alliance can preserve its more valuable elements and minimize the risk of an abrupt and premature rupture”. 3. Ronald Scott Mangum, “NATO’s Attack on Serbia: Anomaly or Emerging Doctrine?” Parameters, Vol. 30, Issue 4 (Winter 2000/2001), p. 3. 4. Headline in Le Monde, September 12, 2001. 5. Wyn Rees, “Transatlantic Relations and the War on Terror”, Journal of Transatlantic Studies, Issue 1 (Spring 2003), p. 80. 6. Europe by no means is one actor, and is divided itself on how to fight terrorism and what NATO’s role should be in the world. The same idea holds when thinking about the US as well. 7. Joesph Nye, “US Power and Strategy After Iraq”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 82 Issue 4 Jul/Aug2003), p. 60. 8. Daniel Nelson, “Transatlantic Transmutations”, The Washington Quarterly (Autumn 2002), p. 60. 9. Frederic Pearson and J. Martin Rochester, International Relations: The Global Condition in the Twenty-First Century (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 1998), p. 684. 10. David Yost, NATO Transformed (Washington, D. C,: USIP, 1998), p. 270. 11. Stephen Walt, “The Precarious Partnership: America and Europe in a New Era,” in Charles Kupchan (ed.), At-lantic Security: Contending Visions (New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations, 1999). 12. Hall Gardner, Dangerous Crossroads: Europe, Russia, and the Future of NATO (London: Praeger Publishing, 1997), p. 157. 13. Jonathan Marcus, “Kosovo and After: American Primacy in the Twenty-First Century”, Washington Quartely, Vol. 23 Issue 1, (Winter 2000), p. 79. 14. Ibid. 15. William Wallace, “From the Atlantic to the Bug, from the Arctic to the Tigris? The transformation of the EU and NATO,” International Affairs Vol.76, 3 (2000), pp. 475-493. 16. Howard Wiarda, “Where Does Europe End? The Politics of NATO and EU Enlargement”, World Affairs, Vol. 164, Issue 4, (Spring 2002), p. 147. 17. Stuart Croft, Jolyon Howorth, Terry Teriff and Mark Webber, “NATO’s Triple Challenge”, International Affairs, Vol.76, Issue 3 (July 2000). 18. Amos Pertmutter, “The Corruption of NATO: NATO moves East”, in Ted Galen (ed.), NATO Enters the 21st Century (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001), pp. 129-154. 19. Richard Rupp, “NATO 1949 and NATO 2000: From Collective Defense Toward Collective security”, in Ted Galen (ed.), NATO Enters the 21st Century (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001). 20. Terry Terriff, Stuart Croft, Elke Krahmann, Jolvon Howorth, and Mark Webber, “One on, all in ? NATO’s Next Enlargement”, International Affairs, Vol. 78, Issue 4, (2002), p. 717. 21. The experience in Kosovo is another example of the rising tensions between Russia and NATO over NATO in-tervention in areas that have been historically under the influence of Moscow. 22. Important because most of the problems on Europe’s periphery border Russia. 23. Stephen Walt, in Charles Kupchan (ed.), Atlantic Security: Contending Visions (New York, NY: Council of Foreign Relations, 1998), p. 2. 24. Ibid. 25. Turkey could be included if it is never allowed to join the EU. 26. Howard Wiarda, “Where Does Europe End? The Politics of NATO and EU Enlargement”, World Affairs, Vol. 164, Issue 4, (Spring 2002), p. 147. 27. Celeste Wallander, “NATO’s Price”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81 Issue 6, (Nov/Dec 2002), p. 2. 28. Ibid. 29. Expansion of the alliance also diversifies opinions about what is in the alliance’s self-interest. 30. Ronald Asmus and Kenneth Pollack, “The New Transatlantic Project: A Response to Robert Kagan”, Policy Re-view (October/November 2002), p. 4. 31. Lord Robertson, “Transforming NATO”, NATO Review (Spring 2003), www.nato.int/docu/review/ 2003/issue1/english/art1.html 32. Robert Kagan, “Power and Weakness”, Policy Review (June & July 2002), p. 4. 33. Andrew Moravcsik, “Striking a New Transatlantic Bargain”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 82, Issue 4, (July/August 2003), p. 5. 34. Michael Dunn, “US Foreign Relations in the Twentieth Century: From World Power to Global Hegemony”, In-ternational Affairs, Vol. 76, Issue 1. (January 2002). Dunn makes a very convincing argument that America’s view and belief in unilateralism is not based only on power. He links it to US’ isolationist past, which argue isolationist tendencies is based on a general idea the US has never wanted to be restrained in defending its national interest: “As Truman himself noted in hid Memoirs, his task was to refashion what may be called the canon of American diplomacy to move American people and Congress away from territorial restrictions of the ‘patron saints’ of iso-lationism (Washington and Monroe particularly) and adopt worldwide multilateralism in the pursuit of American national interests. What Truman failed to ad, like the majority of commentators then and later, was that unilater-alism so treasured by isolationists was not going to be abandoned but rather would be re-enforced by postwar multilateralism, so long desired by the internationalist”. What Dunn is implying is even when the US acted multi-laterally after World War II, and set up the UN and NATO it did because it felt it was the best way to serve its own self-interest. From this idea it is not a major leap to understand that after 9/11 the US would act even more unilateral and move outside NATO to better serve its own interests, rather then have its interests be shackled by a multilateral institution.” 35. Joseph Nye, “US Power and Strategy After Iraq”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 82 Issue 4, (July/August 2003), p. 60. 36. Also take into account US actions before 9/11, opting out of Kyoto, the ICC, and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty all display a unilateral tendency by the US. The interesting thing will be to see if this changes when the current administration changes (Bush)and if the terrorist threat diminishes in the future. 37. Joseph Nye, “US Power and Strategy After Iraq”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 82 Issue 4, (July/August 2003), p. 60. 38. Paul Dibb, “The Future of International Coalitions: How Useful? How Manageable?”, The Washington Quarterly, (Spring 2002), p. 133. 38. Jonathan Stevenson, “How Europe and America Defend Themselves”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 82 Issue 2, (March/April 2003), p. 75.
