Erstellt am: 29.11.2003 Autor: Elizabeth G. Book Status: Bisher nicht definiert
Creating a Transatlantic Army: Does the NATO Response Force subvert the European Union?
The NATO Response Force (NRF), which was set for initial stand-up on 15 October 2003, was planned as a 21,000-person agile brigade-sized military force to be available for brief out-of-area contingency operations, ranging from crisis response to humanitarian evacuations. By October 2004, the force is expected to be ready for limited use on a world-wide scale, and according to reports, will be fully operational by October 2006.
The concept, first suggested by U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, was first approved by heads of state and government at the November 2002 Prague Summit, as part of Secretary-General Lord Robertson’s much-publicized “Prague Capabilities Commitment.” The formal decision establish the NRF was taken by the conference of defense ministers in June 2003 in Brussels, who then tasked the NATO Military Authorities (NMAs) to move forward with the establishment of the NRF. On 8-9 October 2003, in Colorado Springs, United States, NATO defense ministers reviewed the force’s ongoing implementation, and pronounced its importance to the alliance.
The talks in Colorado Springs “highlighted the need for that response force to have capabilities that are agile, swift, and lethal, so that this wonderful alliance of ours can respond quickly and effectively to rapidly unfolding crises,” said Rumsfeld. “It also highlights the need for NATO to transform not only our forces and capabilities, but also to bring NATO's decision-making structures up to date, so that NATO military commanders can take decisive action against fast-moving threats in the 21st century,” he said.
Controversy relating to the NRF’s stand-up lies mainly in two questions: Does the NRF in essence already exist within NATO as part of its rapid reaction forces, and, more significantly, does the existence of such a force within NATO subvert the proposal of an EU Army?
The response to the first question is relatively straightforward: According to official statements, the NRF is meant only for operations in the 7-to-30 day range as opposed to the already existing ARRC (Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps), which can deploy for as many as 90 days. ARRC was proposed by the NATO Defense Planning Committee in May 1991 and confirmed at the Rome Summit in November 1991. The ARRC is a multinational corps in which forward elements can deploy in regions only within Western Europe. It operates on a permanent state of high readiness and can execute missions across a wide spectrum of military and humanitarian operations, from deterrence and crisis management to regional conflict. It can mobilize within 14 days. Corps contributors include Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. Merging or partnering the NRF and the ARRC has not been proposed, though both forces are administrated through the office of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe.
Merging the two is perhaps not planned because projects undertaken by the NRF are to be
“tailored” according to the individual situation, drawing on pre-identified land, maritime, or air components that would be utilized depending upon the nature or goal of the mission. The NRF’s mission is not meant to compete with the ARRC, which would more likely conduct peacekeeping missions. Instead, they are envisioned to conduct “complementary activities.”
The completed new force will have secure deployable communications; protection for nuclear, chemical and biological emergencies; precision-strike capabilities and good strategic airlift abilities. Consisting of air, maritime and ground forces, forces are envisioned to be rotated on assignment every six months. Units assigned will undergo specialized training to ensure they are capable of fighting together effectively on short notice.
The answer to the second question, whether the NRF would subvert any EU Army or response force, is not nearly as clear. It was widely reported that France expressed concerns and may not have wholly supported the NRF plan when it was originally brought up at the Prague Summit. However, comments from a French foreign ministry spokesman in May 2003 seem to indicate France’s general support of the measure: “Implementation of the reforms agreed (upon) in Prague is moving forward, particularly the formation of a NATO response force, the NRF. France hopes that the future NRF meets the objectives set at Prague: to provide, under the direction of the North Atlantic Council, a tool that performs well and is compatible with the European Union's demarché,” he said
Germany’s foreign minister Joschka Fischer said that while German support of the NRF was clear, it hinged on three conditions. First, he said that decisions on when to deploy the response force on missions must be made unanimously by the North Atlantic Council. Second, given the existing legal situation, German soldiers’ involvement will be possible only with the prior consent of the Bundestag. Fischer also said that the plan must be compatible with the development of a European rapid reaction force in the framework of the European security and defense policy.
On the whole, it appears that the proposed EU response force has not gained the momentum that would be required for its stand-up, and that the NRF, as the first to stand-up, is likely to glean the lion’s share of Europe’s limited resources. Certainly, the favorable position toward the NRF by prominent EU members France and Germany indicates that they have determined that the NRF either will not subvert the EU, or that the EU’s force would look different enough to justify the existence of both. Either way, in the time before the ratification of the EU constitution, it is possible that the proposal of a common EU Army is stalled.
It is clear that the U.S. position on any multi-national rapid response force is that they would like to have a say in its structure, goals and assignments, making it obvious why they would wish their European allies within NATO to commit to the NATO force. Just as important, it may also be seen as a move by the U.S. to keep NATO’s mission relevant in the 21st century, especially as it relates to international terrorism, following a decade of uncertainty about the reasons for the very existence of NATO, following the collapse of the Soviet Union as both Europe’s and America’s common enemy.
Indeed, Supreme Allied Commander Europe Gen. James Jones said that the force’s stand-up was one of the most important changes in NATO’s structure since the signing of the Washington Treaty. His optimism about the good the force would be able to perform was clear. “Today…we have taken a major step forward in creating the expeditionary capability, essential to countering the globalization of new threats to peace and security,” Jones said.
