The term “oriental despotism” has been and keeps being repeatedly referred to by those who describe and analyse political systems of the Arab Middle East. By the mid-1980s and the early 1990s several Arab regimes, which had been authoritarian for the last 50 years, began a process of modest political liberalisation. Many Western and non-western scholars who perceived these changes saw the Middle East in line with a global surge towards democracy and predicted more open and liberal polities to emerge. By the mid-1990s much of this optimism had disappeared due to the observation that many regimes did not follow the predicted path but rather followed quite the opposite direction. The optimism of the early 1990s has now been replaced by a feeling of renewed or “modernized” forms of authoritarian regimes in the Arab Middle East.

When examining the events of September 11th and the subsequent US attempts to build an international alliance against terrorism, this brief historical sketch seems important to understand the current developments in the region. Soon after the events of September 11th the USA made it clear that it was going to form an international coalition to combat terrorism. In the American quest for international support in the “war against terrorism” several Arab regimes, notably Jordan, Saudi-Arabia and Egypt, played a prominent role and were seen as important and strategic partners from the point of view of the USA. These regimes, well aware of their strategic importance as American partners, can count on American political, military and economic support. This bargain seems at first, rather straightforward and common. When looking at the wider implications, however, especially in view to the modest political liberalisation processes as sketched out above and in view of the lack of domestic support of these regimes, this unconditional American support is a very ambiguous and paradoxical case. The absence of any fundamental American critique regarding the domestic political behaviour of these regimes represents a “chance for a clampdown” against political dissidents. This finding as such is not new. Some commentators see the current crackdown as simply a continuation of past policy. What is qualitatively new, however, is the intensification of this trend since September 11th and the fact that the present situation allows most Arab regimes to combat any domestic political dissenters in the name of an anti-terrorist fight. In Jordan, for instance, the country’s penal code has been amended, introducing anti-terrorist regulations and tightening press restrictions which impose jail terms for slandering the monarchy and for writings seen to undermine national security. Although these measures might turn out to be only temporary, many Jordanians fear that they are permanent and see them as an illustration of how the US-led anti-terror campaign has been misused for the introduction of additional restrictions on public freedom. In this regard Jordan is not unique. Kenneth Roth, executive director of Human Rights Watch, has noted that the “anti-terror campaign led by the United States is inspiring opportunistic attacks on civil liberties around the world.”

Egypt is another case in point. For years, the Egyptian regime has fought its fight against Islamists with such vigour, that the country’s two armed Islamists groups, the Gamaat Islamiya and the Islamic Jihad, virtually ceased to function at home in recent years. In the aftermath of the September attack, however, the regime has stiffened its crackdown on Islamists, ordering an unprecedented 243 alleged militants to be referred to military courts. Two-thirds of them are said to be from the Gamaat Islamiya, suggesting that the Egyptian state has abandoned its relative leniency vis-à-vis this group following the latter’s declared cease-fire in 1999. The parallel handling of Taliban and al-Qaeda prisoners by the USA in Guantanamo Bay and its declared decision to set up military tribunals for these prisoners has had a non-neglectable effect on the Egyptian case. Roula Khalaf comments on this as follows: “Who can now criticise Egypt for setting up military courts? The US is doing it and the world says its right”.

In some countries, repression has not significantly increased after September 11th but the world’s preoccupation with security, and America’s need for allies, have given governments new opportunities to crush dissent in the name of fighting terrorism. The Algerian case seems almost to be paradigmatic in this regard. In the 1990s the country has witnessed one of the bloodiest civil wars in recent history, with a death toll of over 100,000 deaths. Although it is clear that both the Algerian regime and the armed Islamic groups bear responsibility for this grave escalation, nevertheless several observers and scholars agree over the fact that the Algerian regime must be held accountable for many atrocities committed after 1994. Furthermore, the ongoing armed confrontation with armed Islamic “terrorist” – even after the unilateral cease-fire of the Armée islamique du Salut (AIS) in October 1997 - offers the Algerian regime the possibility of maintaining a “fear of Islamism” in the international media. In this context it cannot be completely excluded that several violent attacks which the regime claims have been committed by Islamic groups, have in fact been conducted or ordered by state forces. What is striking, however, with regard to the present situation following September 11th is the fact that the harsh position of the Algerian regime vis-à-vis the Islamists in Algeria and its repeated claim that there are no moderate Islamists in general seems now to be shared by most world leaders and Western public opinion at large. Algeria’s president, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, has recently underlined this when he remarked that for a decade his country has “fought alone, finding neither friends nor brothers” but that now the world is finally becoming aware of the dangers of Islamic terrorism. From this one might further conclude that the world and the USA in particular should turn to Algeria and learn from its struggle with Islamist militants. With this in mind, it seems hardly surprising that Abdelaziz Bouteflika has been received twice by US president Bush in 2001 and that he was among the first Muslim leaders to offer help in the war against terrorism.
What then are the prospects for the future? With regard to international anti-terrorism coalition one of the most decisive issues will be whether the USA decides to attack Iraq or even to remove Saddam Hussein from power. Such a US attack may well enhance the perception that the United States is making Muslims in general its target and thus unravel the reluctant Arab support for the present international coalition. The fundamental problem lies with the Arab regimes and their lack of legitimacy among the masses of their population. In light of the fact that Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan are already struggling to contain public opinion over their ties to Washington and additionally in view of the strong American support for Israel , a US attack on Iraq, which at the time of writing seems rather possible , might prove to be too problematic for the present delicate balance within the respective regimes but also with regard to the international anti-terrorism coalition as a whole. However, the bleak picture painted in the international media which portrays the current tensions in the region as the first signs that some Arab regimes might be “washed away” or alternatively that they are facing “civil wars within their communities .... or end up in a war of civilizations, between communities” seems to be exaggerated. A more realistic prognosis is that the current level of repression in these Arab regimes will continue or even increase and that further attempts to create more pluralistic polities in these countries will have been postponed for the time being.